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Abstract: 
Why do people who face rather similar situations sometimes resort to violence and others do not? 
While  structural  factors  are  often  assumed  to  be  of  high  explanatory  value  for  explaining  the 
occurrence of violence, more recent approaches focused more on local dynamics and the specific 
position of agents in the political and economic system. Case studies entangling the specific reasons 
why people engage in violence are suited to gain further insight into these dynamics. Based on a  
comparison  of  the  cases  of  North  Sinai  and  South  Sinai  which  show very  different  levels  of 
violence despite sharing many similarities, this thesis shows the diversity of motives for individuals 
to engage in violent activities in North Sinai. At the same time it illustrates the importance of a 
shared interest that increases societal cohesion in the South of the peninsula and allows the people  
there to maintain nonviolent discipline.
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1. Introduction
People do not naturally and without any hesitation resort to violence. Political restrictions, 
psychological  thresholds,  personal  risks  and  other  barriers  constitute  strong  arguments  against 
violence. Those barriers against the commitment of violent acts are being differently pronounced in 
the various political and social contexts as well as over time but they are, everywhere and at any 
time, ultimately and in principal, flexible and can be overcome – violence constitutes a global and 
timeless phenomenon. As Peter Imbusch formulates, “No society, no region of the world, no culture 
is free of violence: the peaceful savage of earlier civilizations turned out to be a myth just like the 
expectations of a violence-free modern age (Keeley, 1996; Joas, 1994)” (Imbusch 2002). In most 
cases of political violence however, as Jochen Hippler points out (2007), it is the case that this 
violence  is  a  symptom of  social,  economic  or  political  crises,  which  is  often  also  reflected  in 
ideological or spiritual shifts. The decision to engage in acts of violence is influenced amongst other 
things by arising opportunities, feared repressions, available legitimization strategies and individual 
and collective acceptance of violence (Enzmann 2013). 
While there is on the one hand no automatism behind the occurrence of violence, there is on 
the  other  hand  also  no  single  universally  accepted  explanation  for  the  occurrence  of  political 
violence (Enzmann 2013). Two theoretical approaches have emerged in recent decades as dominant 
in the aspiration to explain the occurrence of violence. On the one hand, theoretical literature on 
revolutions has focused above all on the structural conditions that lead to revolutions and civil war 
(Skocpol  1979; Goldstone 1991).  On the other  hand,  theories  of  social  movements  focused on 
structural  characteristics  of  movements,  and emphasized  mobilizing  structures  and the  political 
context that determines the mobilization and trajectories of social movements (McAdam et al. 1996; 
Meyer 2004), while at the same time focusing on the effects of collective action frames (Snow et al. 
1986,  Snow  and  Benford  1988).  However,  accepting  the  complexity  of  violence,  academia 
nowadays has partly abandoned mono-causal and structural approaches and proceeded on to focus 
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instead on multidimensional approaches and local dynamics (Ibid.). Within this newer approach, 
groups or movements are not seen as monolithic actors anymore; rather, the individual motives, the 
dynamics at the local level, and the direct political and economic environment of agents is analyzed. 
Accordingly,  as  Brigitte  Enzmann  points  out  in  the  'Handbuch  Politische  Gewalt'  [English: 
Handbook Political Violence] (2013), theories regarding individual forms of violence and small-n 
comparisons from one time frame or region are dominating the research field at the moment. This 
thesis will consist of precisely such a study and compares two, in many characteristics, similar cases 
– North Sinai and South Sinai – in regard to the different amounts of violence occurring there.
The Egyptian peninsula of Sinai constitutes one of the strategically most important areas for 
the  country  –  given  the  economic  importance  of  the  Suez  canal,  tourism  in  Sinai,  and  the 
peninsula's function as buffer zone to Israel – and for decades its indigenous people's interests have 
been largely ignored by the central authorities in Cairo who systematically advantaged the Nile 
Valley People (NVP). The terrorist attacks in Sinai in 2004, 2005, and 2006 as well as more recent 
outbursts of violence in Sinai are said to be “symptomatic of major tensions and conflicts in Sinai  
and, above all, of its problematic relationship to the Egyptian nation-state” and “unless these factors 
are addressed effectively, there is no reason to assume the terrorist movement can be eliminated” 
(ICG 2007: 3). While most of the international attention since February 2011 has been focused upon 
Cairo where, admittedly, the most important events within this development took place, and where 
the critical decisions regarding the future of the country were and will be made, the situation in 
Sinai has been steadily deteriorating (NPR 2012). The international community and neighboring 
countries,  in particular  Israel  which shares  a  long and strategically essential  border with Sinai,  
perceived “Egypt as losing grip over Sinai, transforming the peninsula into a theater for the region's 
competing  new  forces”  (Pelham  2012).  Sinai's  function  as  a  buffer  between  the  regional 
heavyweights Egypt and Israel is said to be endangered. A report of the Israeli domestic intelligence 
agency Shin Bet arrived at the conclusion that while Egypt's new government is preoccupied with 
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safeguarding their  power and stabilizing the country,  “governance in Sinai is  not high and this 
allows smugglers to operate almost without hindrance” (Reuters 13.05.2011). An Israeli columnist, 
Ron Ben Yishai, wrote that the Bedouins hold “huge depots of heavy machine guns, RPG rockets 
and launchers of all types, anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, as well as advanced Grad rockets and 
worse” and suggested they were “getting trained from Palestinian terrorists from Gaza as well as  
from Global Jihad members” (Lina Attalah 04.07.2012). Even an article in Haaretz, a leftist Israeli 
newspaper stated that “even though Cairo doesn't admit to it officially, all involved have already 
come to understand that the desert peninsula has become a no-man's land, over which Egyptian 
authorities don't bear even the slightest pretension of control” (Haaretz 05.04.2012)  As Nicolas 
Pelham puts it: “With multiple internal and external factors eroding its ties to the center, Sinai's 
indigenous population greeted President Mubarak's February 2011 resignation as an opportunity to 
shrug off Egypt's internal security yoke and push for communal empowerment” (Pelham 2012: 5).
However, a closer look at the developments in Sinai since 2011 reveals a stark difference 
between the opposition to the central authorities in North and South Sinai. While North Sinai indeed 
witnessed repeated outbursts of violence, the southern part of the peninsular remained fairly calm 
and opposition to the central authorities was expressed almost exclusively in nonviolent ways. Why 
do people who face rather similar situations remain nonviolent and others  not?
Based on a cross case analysis  of North and South Sinai, I argue that both internal and 
external factors are essential for preventing the people in South Sinai to take up arms and engage in 
violent action. Both structural conditions and a variety of individual motives have to be considered 
to understand current developments in Sinai. In North Sinai, what is often perceived as political 
(radical Islamist or tribal) movements engaging in violence against the state are in fact multiple 
disconnected actors with a variety of agendas and motives. In South Sinai, it is the societal cohesion 
that prevents individual spoilers from engaging in violent actions against the Egyptian authorities 
and foreigners in the region. This societal cohesion, or the lack thereof, can be traced back on the 
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one hand to the differing demographic structures in North and South Sinai, and even more strongly 
on the other  to the different economic dependencies of the respective populations and the direct 
environment they live in. Furthermore, the varying historic experiences of the indigenous Bedouin 
population  under  Israeli  occupation  following the  1967 war  provides  an  important  explanatory 
factor. 
The remainder of this thesis proceeds as follows. First, the theoretical independent variables 
will be outlined based on the theoretical literature on nonviolence. Then, I will briefly introduce the 
reader to the historical context of Sinai, beginning with the Israeli occupation of the peninsular in 
1967. In the following section I will illustrate the similarities between South and North Sinai which 
facilitate the occurrence of violence in both areas. Subsequently, I will provide an overview over the 
developments in Sinai between February 2011 and February 2013 and show the stark differences in 
the occurrence of violence between North Sinai and South Sinai. These acts of violence will then  as 
far  as  possible  be  grouped  into  different  types.  This  serves  as  a  foundation  to   enter  into  the 
explanatory section, focusing on the question of how the almost complete nonexistence of  violent  
incidents in South Sinai can be explained.
2. Existing Explanations
Violence in this thesis is defined in a very narrow way as the purposeful, direct physical 
damaging  of  people  by  other  people  conducted  in  the  public  sphere  (Enzmann  2013).  The 
application  of  this  definition offers  several  advantages,  as  a  result  of  which  it  is  applicable  in 
political  science.  First,  the focus on physical  violence significantly narrows down the range of 
incidents under analysis, but – important for example in the case of Sinai – also includes forms of  
violence like kidnappings. At the same time, the definition is broad enough to include more than 
political  violence  just  understood  as  extremist  violence  and  terrorism.  In  order  to  explain  the 
differences in the dependent variable – the occurrence of violence – between North and South Sinai, 
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a broad corpus of theoretical literature will be used to identify possible variables. The theoretical 
literature can be divided into two parts; firstly, the part focusing on the structural factors facilitating 
violence; and  secondly, into the the literature focusing on the micro-dynamics and the individual 
choice of actors to engage in violent activities. The key difference is that in the first approach, 
individual interests are ignored and all actors are treated similarly, whereas the second approach 
gives far more attention to individual motives of agents and their location within the political and 
economic system for engaging in specific actions. For this thesis, theories are drawn first from the  
literature on the occurrence and reasons for civil war and its key independent variables will be 
outlined. One of the problems in regard to this part of the literature is that it usually focuses on 
cases of actual civil war, defined as “an internal conflict with at least 1.000 combat-related deaths, 
with both an identifiable rebel organization and government forces suffering at least five percent of 
these casualties (Collier 2002: 3). These categories are not fulfilled in neither North Sinai nor South 
Sinai  as  casualties  thus  far  ranged  far  below  the  1.000  threshold.  However,  the  identified 
independent variables are still relevant for this research and the situation in North Sinai in several 
ways resembles that of a civil war – or perhaps that of an emerging one. First, there are from time to 
time intense battles involving machine guns, mortars, RPGs, tanks, and a range of other weapons. 
Furthermore, there are several distinct radical Islamist movements active in the North of Sinai, and 
also the number of casualties on the government side by far exceeds the five percent threshold of 
the aforementioned definition. Within this literature, above all Paul Collier (1998, 2002), Stathis 
Kalyvas (2003), and Jochen Hippler (2007) provide the literature based on which the independent 
variables will be identified. 
Furthermore,  independent  variables  will  be  drawn from the  literature  on  the  inverse  of 
political violence, nonviolent resistance. Again, the cases analyzed in this thesis do not entirely fit  
the theory, as for example in South Sinai there is not really a specific movement representing one 
particular  group.  Instead,  since  2011,  Egypt's  political  system  has  been  a  multi-party system. 
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Considering that independence is not one of the goals of local Bedouins or Palestinians, nonviolent 
action with the particular goal of “social change and increased justice through peaceful means” is 
adequate for this thesis (Lederach 1995: 15). In such a situation, Cunningham (2013) separates three 
forms of action people can take.  “They can press their  demands through conventional  political 
channels, such as engaging in electoral politics, petitioning the state, or pursuing legal recourse” 
(Cunningham 2013: 292). Alternatively,  “groups can also resort to irregular (or unconventional) 
politics. This means strategies … which operate outside or normal institutional channels. Irregular 
politics can involve either violent challenges or nonviolent tactics” (Ibid.). Within the literature, 
there is a basic distinction between principled nonviolence and pragmatic nonviolence, with the 
latter  as the focus of  this thesis (Dudouet 2011: 242). Principled nonviolence describes approaches 
which promote the adherence to nonviolence for “religious, moral or philosophical reasons, or in 
other words, by conviction rather than by expediency” (Ibid: 243). Within this cultural approach 
explaining nonviolence as shaped by non-instrumental factors (McAdam 2000), many argue that 
something in Arab culture or Islam predisposes the respective groups to violence (Pearlman 2012: 
26). Given that the Bedouin in both North and South Sinai belong to a similar ethnic group and 
share  the  same  religion  and  traditions,  this  thesis  will  focus  on  strategic  nonviolence  and  the 
pragmatic choice for this approach in the South,  compared to the more violent approach in the 
North.  The literature offers a broad corpus of comparative studies of past nonviolent campaigns 
( e.g. Sémelin 1993; Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Zunes et al. 1999; Ackerman and Duvall 2000; 
Sharp 2005; Schock 2005; Roberts and Ash 2009) as well as statistical studies (e.g. Bond 1994; 
Karatnycky and  Ackerman  2005;  Stephan  and  Chenoweh  2008)  which  identified  a  number  of 
factors facilitating nonviolence (Duduouet  2011:  244).  In the following sections,  the theoretical 
literature will be summarized, and subsequently independent variables and according hypotheses 
will be outlined. In general, two approaches  can therefore be distinguished. On the one hand, based 
on a structural approach, scholars argue that specific characteristics of a state in general lead to 
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violence  and  political  upheaval.  On  the  other,  more  recent  scholars  argue  that  there  is  no 
automatism connecting structural deficits and non-state violence. The choice to engage in violence 
is described as a rational decision based on assumed costs and benefits of such a behavior.
2.1. Structural Factors
 Following John Galtung's definition of structural violence in his paper “Violence, Peace and 
Peace  Research”  (1969),  the  research  on  violence  until  the  late  1990s  was  dominated  by  the 
tendency to understand the term as broadly as possible (Enzmann 2013). According to Galtung, 
“when the potential is higher than the actual is by definition avoidable and when it is avoidable, 
then violence is present”  (Galtung 1969: 169) and refers to a form of violence where some social 
structure  or institution  may  harm  people  by  preventing  them  from  reaching  their  theoretical 
potential. The term was often used in order to illustrate “the extent and in which partly subtle ways 
people in modern societies are injured, harmed, or oppressed” (Enzmann 2013.: 44). Based on this 
approach to violence, theories have long emphasized how “economic, political, and demographic 
change  alters  class  relations  and  state  structures  to  produce  revolutions  (e.g.  Skocpol  1979; 
Goldstone 1991)” (Schock 2013: 281). 
It is argued that one of the decisive factors for engaging in violent strategies or not is the 
degree of exclusion from the political system. Even if groups face tensions with the government,  
“there is variation in the degree to which they are included in governance and in their relative 
economic position in the state (Hechter 1975; Gourevitch 1979)” (Cunningham 2013: 296). Some 
groups are better connected to the center by being included in the government, having beneficial 
relations  with  it,  or  possessing more local  control  over  their  territory while  others  are  entirely 
excluded. These groups then are supposed to apply to more institutionalized channels to voice their 
grievances. Groups that are less connected to the state are less likely to rely on institutionalized 
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political channels to achieve their goals. The reason for this is the lack of trust in official channels  
and  their  perception  of  being  intentionally disadvantaged  by the  ruling  classes.  The  economic 
position of a group also affects their motivation for engaging in violence against the state. If groups 
are significantly poorer than the average citizen they are likely to have greater grievances as a result  
of perceived economic discrimination. These grievances, coupled with the awareness that others are 
better  off  than  oneself,  lead  to  violence  against  those  benefiting  of  the  existing  structures.  As 
Cunningham points out, “there is significant evidence that more aggrieved groups are more likely to 
rebel” (Cunningham 2013: 296). Collier's  ‘grievance’ model (2002) examines inequality, political 
oppression, and ethnic and religious divisions as causes of conflict (Collier 2002: 1). The question 
in this approach is, to what extent can the initiation of a rebellion be predicted by differences in 
objective grievances (Ibid.: 12). Tobias Debiel  argues that the behavior of the state in regard to its 
people – in particular in regard to its minorities – is the decisive factor which predetermines the 
occurrence of political violence. “Part of the structural reasons for violence and one of the most 
essential  issues  of  conflicts  are  in  particular  the  ongoing  threatening  of  cultural  identity  by 
repression of the state, the exclusion of the exertion of power on the state level,  the persistent 
refusal  of  regional  autonomy  or  local  self-determination”  (Debiel  2004:  6).  “If  under  such 
circumstances  the  collective  feeling  of  discrimination  or  oppression  connects  with  the 
organizational capacity of the affected groups, violent conflicts are sort of preassigned” (Ibid: 7). In 
regard  to  the  Arab  dictatorships,  Hippel  in  2007 remarked  that  these  states  are  so  focused on 
maintaining  their  power  that  they  fail  entirely   on  the  fulfillment  of  fundamental  state  tasks 
(development, rule of law, participation,...), not even trying to resolve them (Hippel 2007). 
According  to  Schock  (2005),  comparable  to  the  repertoires  of  actions  available  to  the 
dissidents,  the  state  also  faces  the  option of  reacting in  different  ways to  the  posed challenge. 
Generally speaking, four types of state response can be identified. First, states can choose to ignore 
the challenges posed to them. Whereas in democracies it is almost impossible to ignore a challenge 
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once it  received a certain amount of support,  in  non-democracies “almost any non-institutional 
political action may be construed as regime-threatening; therefore, ignoring a challenge is a less 
likely  response”  (Schock 2005:  30).  A second option for  the  state  lies  in  the  symbolic  use  of 
gestures to conciliate the challengers and acknowledge that something has to change (Ibid.). Third, 
the state can engage actively in reforms and make concrete concessions which actually alter the 
social or political situation of the challengers (Ibid.: 31). Last but not least, the state can attempt to 
repress  the challenges  by restricting political  or  civil  liberties  (Davenport  2000:  6).  Within the 
theoretical literature it is usually argued that mobilization increases if challenges are simply ignored 
because the actual motivation for challenging the state is not lowered, nor are there any negative 
repercussions for dissidents. Also if concessions are made, mobilization usually increases because 
of bandwaggoning or the so called threshold effect (Francisco 2000; Lichbach 1995; Tocqueville 
1998).  Regarding  repression,  the  outcome  is  more  complicated  to  predict.  On  the  one  hand, 
effective  repression  can  decrease  mobilization  by  raising  the  costs  for  challenging  the  state 
authority. On the other hand, repression can increase peoples' grievances and thereby increase their 
determination to oppose the state. However, violent oppression of challengers increases the risk of 
individuals  or  small  groups  dissenting  from the  nonviolent  strategy  and  resorting  to  violence. 
Thereby they can function as spoilers and undermine nonviolent discipline as a whole. Although I 
argue that the structural deficits for the indigenous population are present to a large degree in both 
cases,  the  following  two  Hypotheses  will  be  included  in  order  to  analyze  whether  there  are 
differences in regard to them that provide further insight into the puzzle.
H1: Violence is more likely the more groups are excluded from political participation.
Observable Evidence: If so, then we should see significant differences in the degree of political 
exclusion of the local population between areas with violence and areas without violence. People in 
North Sinai should be less represented in the political center and maintain  weaker relations to the 
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NVP in their area.
H2: Violence is more likely the more groups are economically disadvantaged. 
Observable Evidence: If so, then we should see significant differences in the degree of economic 
exclusion of the local population between areas with violence and areas without violence. People in 
North Sinai should be significantly poorer than those in South Sinai and more excluded from the 
formal economy.
2.2. Rational Choice
The  structural  approach  and the  resulting  theories  without  doubts  are  useful  to  identify 
contexts in which countries in general are “prone to violence” (Shellman 2013: 333). However, to 
unravel the puzzle why people  facing similar contexts engage in different forms of actions requires 
an  increased  focus  on  the  local  dynamics  and  the  tactical  choices  made  by individual  actors. 
Focusing on the political and economic disadvantages of parts of the population in a given country 
is  a  useful  approach for  understanding general  preconditions  for  conflict,  but  it  is  ill-suited  to 
address the precise dynamics leading to violence as these conditions “are essentially static” (Moore 
1995: 132). There is no automatism behind these structural conditions leading to violence, in other 
words, “there is no inherent link between conflict and violence” (Calestino 2013: 389). Kathleen 
Cunningham (2013) examines the determinants influencing the strategic choice “by analyzing how 
a variety of factors affect the costs and benefits of conventional political strategies, mass nonviolent 
campaign, and civil war” (Cunningham 2013: 291). She argues that groups pick their strategies 
“based on the costs of those strategies and their anticipation of achieving success through them” 
(Cunningham 2013: 292). To sum up, in contrast to the above-mentioned cultural approach, the 
pragmatic school of nonviolence depicts the motivation behind nonviolent tactics not as a principal 
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commitment,  but  as  a  rationally  chosen  strategy  as  the   most  efficient  and  least  costly  way 
(Ackerman and Kruegler 1994: 17), or because of a lack of alternative options (Sémelin 1993: 30).
Costs and Benefits
The costs or benefits resulting from a chosen strategy stems from two sources. On the one 
hand, groups or individuals engaging in violence thereby provoke some form of state reaction, such 
as  increased  oppression.  Kathleen  Cunningham  for  example  argues  that  one  factor  that 
fundamentally affects the anticipation of costs is “the capacity of states to punish irregular tactics” 
and that “states with high capacity can repress dissent and make groups more likely to use whatever 
institutional channels are available rather than pursuing more risky strategies” (Cunningham 2013: 
292). If people can anticipate severe oppression and a strong response of the state then engaging in 
violent actions becomes more risky which hinders them from choosing to do so. Equally, regular 
economic activities can be disrupted leading to economic costs for the population in the respective 
area. Violence in many ways decreases regular economic activity. For example, checkpoints slow 
down the movement of goods and people or investors  and visitors are deterred.  Collier  (1998) 
identifies four variables – initial income, ethno-linguistic fractionalisation, the amount of natural 
resources, and the initial population size as significant and strong determinants of the probability of 
civil war (Ibid.). First, he found that the higher the per capita income in a specific region, the lower  
the risk of civil war (Ibid.: 571). Second, natural resource endowments have a non-monotonic effect 
and initially increase the risk of war, but at a high level start to reduce the risk of it (Ibid.). Third,  
greater population increases the risk of war (Ibid.). Last but not least, contrary to common opinion 
which often cites ethnic division as a reason for civil  war, Collier found this  explanation to be 
incorrect (Ibid.). In line with this economic risk model, Collier further elaborated on the factor of 
greed, focusing on the sources of finance for potential rebels (Collier 2002: 1). For the occurrence 
of  civil  war,  “the  critical  parameters  are  the  financial  opportunities  for  rebels,  the  social  and 
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geographic constraints which they face, and the financial capability of the government to provide 
defense” (Ibid.: 35). His model is based on utility theory and he argues that rebels “will conduct a 
civil war if the perceived benefits outweigh the costs of rebellion” (Collier 1998: 563). Benefits 
relate to two things. On the one hand, benefits can occur in the form of achieving political goals of 
the respective group. In this case, the violent acts are effective tools in pressuring the government to 
give in to demands of the perpetrators who thereby achieve their goal. On the other hand, benefits 
can be of an economic nature, meaning that the commitment of violent acts increases the income of 
a group.  For example, violent acts against the government can serve the purpose of gaining control  
over specific sources of income like taxation in an area or access to natural resources like diamonds 
or gold.  Similarly, groups or individuals who are engaged in economic activities which are opposed 
by the state can use violence to protect their income source.
H3: The bigger the economic costs expected to result from violence, the less likely violence.
Observable Evidence: If so then we should see distinct differences in the potential economic losses 
as a result of violence between areas experiencing violence and areas without violence. People in 
North Sinai should have less to lose in financial terms from engaging in violence than people in 
South Sinai.
H4: The bigger the political costs expected to result from violence, the less likely violence.
Observable  Evidence:  If  so  then  we  should  see  distinct  differences  in  the  capacity  for  state 
repression against violent actors between areas experiencing violence and areas without violence. 
The state should be less able to oppress the violent agitators in North Sinai than in South Sinai.
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2.3. Group Cohesion
Movement-internal factors long dominated the research on nonviolence and a considerable 
amount of literature addresses this factor. Wendy Pearlman emerged as one of the leading scholars 
on NVR and focuses in particular on movement cohesion as independent variable that determines 
violence or nonviolence as outcome (Pearlman 2012). According to Pearlman, the main explanatory 
variable  is  “a movement's  internal  political  cohesion,  or  its  inverse,  fragmentation”  (Ibid.:  27). 
Political cohesion as independent variable can be measured by evaluating three factors that facilitate 
or  hinder  the  cooperation  within  a  group:  “leadership,  organizational  structure,  and a  sense  of 
collective purpose” (Ibid.: 28). The causal logic behind Pearlman's argument is “that a movement's 
cohesion systematically affects its protest strategy because different forms of protest have different 
organizational requirements” (Ibid.: 29). Accordingly,  “broad-based participation,  discipline,  and 
strategic coherence are beneficial for the success of either violent or nonviolent tactics” (Ibid.). 
However, group cohesion is far more important for nonviolent resistance than for violent resistance 
because the potential risks for a nonviolent strategy posed by individual spoilers engaging in violent 
actions are immense. Therefore, only if a movement is able to maintain cohesion, “it can obtain the 
organizational  capacity  to  enlist  large  numbers  of  participants,  design  and  implement  coherent 
strategies, and maintain discipline” (Ibid.). Adria Lawrence (2010) also identified group cohesion as 
critical element for nonviolent protest. Based on an analysis of opposition to the French Colonial 
empire,  she  argues  that  “violence  resulted  from internal  contestation  among  nationalist  actors” 
(Lawrence 2010: 90). Violence broke out as a result of fragmentation of the opposition movements 
bringing about situations in which “a leadership vacuum created an opening for new nationalist 
actors to compete for local power” (Ibid.) In those situations, opposition members “used violence to 
demonstrate their commitment to the nationalist cause, consolidate control over particular localities, 
and eliminate rivals” (Ibid.). Marianne Dahl similarly argues that “between group competition tend 
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to increase the likelihood of a shift from non-violent to violent strategies“ (Dahl 2012). Where, 
however, “ nationalist movements remained centralized, mobilization remained primarily peaceful, 
relying on strategies such as protest, diplomacy, and party formation” (Lawrence 2010: 90). The 
problem in Sinai with this approach is as mentioned above the lack of specific movements and 
accordingly the lack of factors like leadership or organizational structures. However, this is dealt 
with by focusing on the one hand on societal cohesion as variable – the cohesion of the society 
inhabiting each of the two theaters as a whole – and on the other hand, on the sense of collective 
purpose, or shared interest, as main indicator.
Stathis Kalyvas (2003) argues in a similar direction and further builds on the greed and 
grievances distinction of Collier. He argues that a binary perspective on civil wars is misleading. As 
Kalyvas  argues,  a  characterization  of  conflicts  along  these  lines  is  far  more  complicated  than 
anticipated because of the usually present “perplexing combination of identities and actions” which 
turns  their  characterization  “into  a  quest  for  an  ever-deeper  'real'  nature,  presumably  hidden 
underneath misleading facades” (Kalyvas 2003: 476). He therefore argues for an understanding of 
the conflict's “dynamics as substantially shaped by local cleavages” which  “is also fully consistent 
with recurring suggestions that master cleavages often fail to account for the nature of the conflict  
and its violence” (Ibid.: 479). Assuming a simple Bedouins versus the state cleavage as suggested 
by  the  above-mentioned  tribal  studies  is  therefore  ill-suited  to  really  understand  the  dynamics 
behind the occurrence of violence without looking at the dynamics at the local level. 
Bakke et  al.  (2012) focus on internal  fighting of  opposition groups,  instead of violence 
against the state or other not movement-internal actors, but arrive at a similar conclusion regarding 
the correlation between group cohesion and the occurrence of violence. While much of the previous 
research assumed “stable group boundaries and identities, moving (with more or less justification) 
from a challenge to state authority to the existence of relatively unified movements acting on behalf 
of bounded, nonstate groups”, “recent work regards actors not as unitary or coherent challengers, 
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but as a shifting set of actors who share a central identity but who have malleable allegiances and 
potentially divergent interests” (Ibid.). Similar to Lawrence (2010) and Pearlman (2012) who relate 
increased  fragmentation  to  increased  violence,  they  argue  that  “in  an  extremely  fragmented 
movement  with  many  organizations,  weak  institutionalization,  and  decentralized  power,  the 
probability of violent infighting is very high” (Ibid.: 13). The problem in regard to Sinai is similar 
to the general one in regard to group cohesion as Bakke et al. focus on movements. Again, this will 
be dealt with by focusing on fragmentation and resulting infighting of the society as a whole.
H5: The greater the cohesion of a group, the less likely individuals or small groups engage in 
violent actions. 
Observable evidence: If true, then the areas not experiencing any violence should be characterized 
by a higher degree of cohesion than those areas experiencing violence. Furthermore, there should be 
common agreement between the inhabitants of the respective area that nonviolence as a strategy 
constitutes the most beneficial (or least costly) option. The contrary should be the case in areas of 
violent opposition, where the population is assumed to be far more fragmented, thereby not acting 
under a common guidance.
3. Methodology and Case Selection
Although  studies  analyzing  large-N  quantitative  data  are  well  suited  to  identify  links 
between independent and dependent variables, they tend to “say little about the links between cause 
and effect” (Mampilly 2011: 18). Instead, I will apply qualitative methods and engage in process 
tracing to illustrate the causal mechanisms that link the above-mentioned independent variables to 
the different outcomes.  In particular, I will  apply a process orientated analysis in order to acquire a 
deeper understanding of how the different independent variables facilitated nonviolence in South 
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Sinai, while North Sinai sled into violence. Heuristic approaches of this sort are an adequate method 
for further developing theories, which seems particularly suited for this thesis.  Heuristic refers to 
experience-based techniques for problem solving, learning, and discovery. Where the exhaustive 
search is impractical, heuristic methods are used to speed up the process of finding a satisfactory 
solution; mental short cuts to ease the cognitive load of making a decision. This enables one to 
“inductively identify new variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and causal paths” (George and 
Bennett, 2005 : 75). Considering that information on the developments in Sinai is fairly scarce, only 
few in-depth  studies  are  available,  and  traveling  to  the  Northern  part  of  the  peninsular  is  not 
possible for security reasons, a heuristic approach is adequate to disentangle the puzzle on the basis 
of the available information. 
This thesis will consist of a cross case analysis of two cases and compares the situation in 
North Sinai with that in South Sinai. The peninsula constitutes of two governorates – North and 
South Sinai – which are each considered to be one case. The research objective is to answer the 
question  why  there  is  no  violence  in  South  Sinai,  while  North  Sinai  since  February  2011 
experienced significant outbursts of violence.  The two cases offer themselves for a comparison 
because they share many similarities which facilitate the occurrence of violence in both areas. The 
research therefore is conducted in the framework of the method of differences which attempts to 
identify different independent variables associated with different outcomes between rather similar 
cases. The strength of such an approach is above all twofold. On the one hand the application of 
existing  theoretical  frameworks  tests  them  for  their  explanatory  value  in  specific  cases. 
Furthermore, the process oriented approach focusing on only a very limited number of cases allows 
for the identification of possible other independent variables which are not adequately represented 
within the existing corpus of theoretical literature.  Thereby,  new angles  for future research can 
possibly be identified.  On the other hand, several limitations result from this approach. Obviously 
North Sinai and South Sinai do not constitute perfect cases for Mill's method of difference which 
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aims  at  identifying  the  one  decisive  variable  shaping  the  outcome.  Rather,  several  different 
independent variables will be identified. However, it is impossible to be sure that all possible and 
relevant variables have been identified. Furthermore, it is difficult to generalize the findings of such 
a small-n study, in particular given the number of independent variables. The evidence upon which 
the  explanatory  part  of  the  thesis  will  be  based  on  is  threefold.  First,  political  as  well  as 
anthropological  and  historical  secondary  studies  on  Sinai  and  the  region  will  be  incorporated. 
Second,  a  large  corpus  of   articles  has  been  collected.  Egypt  Independent  (the  platform was 
unfortunately closed down by the Egyptian government in March 2013 but all information is still  
available  online)  fortunately  not  only  provided  own  articles  and  analysis,  but  also  provided 
translated articles from Al-Masry Al-Youm and MENA as well as news articles from DPA, AP and 
AFP. Third, a small fieldwork study in South Sinai was conducted during which several discussions 
with local Bedouins and NVP were held. These discussions however were of very informal nature 
and will only on some occasions been incorporated in this thesis. Rather they served as sources of 
underlying information and helped to identify the relevant dynamics. 
There is also a practical motivation for choosing Sinai as a case study. The developments in 
Sinai are still unfolding and this thesis therefore deals not with a historic case, but a contemporary 
political question. Considering the importance of Sinai for Egypt and Israel it is of high importance 
to actually understand properly why people in North Sinai resort to violence. On the one hand, this 
allows  for  the  identification  of  possible  political  approaches  to  solve  the  crisis.  Furthermore, 
although South Sinai so far  has not experienced any larger outbreaks of violence, it is questionable 
whether  is  going  to  remain  the  case.  By  understanding  why  people  in  South  Sinai  remain 
nonviolent, it is also possible to identify what has to be done to maintain that stability and whether 
it is likely that the nonviolent discipline in South Sinai can be upheld.
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4. Historical Context of Sinai 1967 until 2011
Sinai until the end of Israeli Occupation 1982
Aside  from constituting  the  land  bridge  between  Africa  and  Asia,  Sinai  gained  sudden 
strategic importance after  the Suez canal was opened 1869. Shortly after coming under British 
administration, Sinai was officially integrated into the Egyptian territory in 1902 and the borders to 
Northern  Territories,  back  then  the  Ottoman  empire,  were  specified  (ICG  2007).  The  Sinai 
peninsular returned to international prominence in 1956 after the new Egyptian President Gamal 
Abdel Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal against the will of Great Britain and France who, based 
on the old lease agreement, still controlled the Canal and its shores. Subsequently, Israeli troops 
invaded the peninsula as part of a British-French plot to instigate a reason for intervening between 
the Egyptian and Israeli Forces and thereby regaining control of the canal. Following international 
pressure in particular from the US and the Soviet Union however the non-Egyptian troops had to 
retreat and the first international UN-Peacekeepers in Sinai (UNEF I) were installed; they remained 
in Sinai until 1967.
1967 constitutes a key date for the entire Middle Eastern region and Sinai in particular. 
Following increasing tensions between Israel and the Arab states, and the UNEF I troops leaving 
Sinai  as  demanded  by  Nasser,  the  third  Arab-Israeli  war  shook  the  region.  Israel  launched  a 
preventive attack  against  Syria  and Egypt  in  particular  and dealt  a  crushing defeat  to  its  Arab 
adversaries. This led to the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights, the West Bank, Gaza, and the 
Sinai peninsula. The peninsula was then under Israeli control for fifteen years before the October 
War of 1973 initiated a series of negotiations which finally led to the Camp David accords between 
Israel and Egypt in 1979 and the return of Sinai to Egypt in 1982. 
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Sinai returns to Egypt 1982 – 2011
Although Israel also emerged victoriously from the 1973 war and succeeded in crossing the 
canal into the Egyptian heartland – thereby encircling a whole Egyptian army group around the city 
of Suez – the initial successes of in particular the Egyptian offensive across the Suez Canal forced 
the parties back to the negotiation table. Sinai in particular stood in the center of the negotiations at 
Camp  David  under  the  supervision  of  the  United  States.  The  essentials  of  the  Camp  David 
Agreement are as follows. Sinai was to be returned to Egypt in exchange for a peace agreement. 
Furthermore, large parts of the peninsular had to be demilitarized which had a long-term impact on 
the state's capacity to exercise authority in Sinai. More precisely, Sinai and the border region with 
Israel was separated into four zones with different levels of Egyptian military presence (ICG 2007). 
Zone A, the east bank of the canal, still hosts a significant number of Egyptian soldiers due to the 
need to  guarantee  a  safe  passage  through  the  canal  and an  infantry division  of  approximately 
22.000 men  is located there. In Zone B, the Egyptian police –  who are  responsible for most of the  
security in Sinai –  are supported by four Egyptian Army battalions. In Zone C, which consists of 
the Egyptian side of  the border  and the east  coast  of Sinai,  only Egyptian police are  allowed. 
Furthermore, the Multinational Force of Observers (MFO) is stationed in this region to supervise 
the maintenance of the agreement. Last but not least, the Israeli side of the border constitutes Zone 
D,  in  which  Israel  has  four  Infantry  divisions  to  protect  its  side  of  the  border.  Since  Israel 
unilaterally retreated form the Gaza strip,  questions of border control between Egypt and Gaze 
reemerged as critical, and 750 Egyptian soldiers are allowed there to maintain order and support the 
police  in  their  tasks  (ICG  2007).  Israel  has  since  1975  (Kissinger  Interim  Agreements  1975) 
retreated step by step from Sinai, with Taba, to the South of the Israeli Red Sea port of Eilat, being 
the last city returned to Egypt only in 1989. The peace agreement without a doubt constitutes one of 
the essential  elements in  explaining the current developments in the area and led to a  difficult 
situation for both the Egyptians and the Israelis.  Israel  on the one hand expected the Egyptian 
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government  to  effectively control  its  southern side of the border and prevent attacks on Israeli 
territory from there, as well as the smuggling of arms into Gaza. On the other hand Israel intended 
to prevent Sinai from ever becoming a launchpad for a possible Egyptian attack which led to the 
stark limits regarding Egyptian military presence there. 
This left Egypt in a difficult position. The state wanted to gain effective control over the 
peninsula after 1982,  however, this was not possible by simply placing military forces there. At the 
core  for  the  Egyptian  government  stood  the  question,  aside  from how to  maintain  security  in 
general,  of  whether  to  “regard  the  Bedouins  as  fellow  Egyptians  returning  from  exile  or  as 
treacherous collaborators” (Lavie 1984). The Egyptian government in general opted for the latter  
and saw the indigenous people in Sinai as a potential fifth column (Pelham 2012). This resulted in 
control over the local people mainly by a migration policy, supporting the relocation of Nile-Valley-
People (NVP) to Sinai which significantly altered the demographic structures in North and South of  
Sinai. For maintaining control, the state also relied on a strict and widely hated security regime that  
oppressed large parts of the population (Pelham 2012). Although huge amounts of money went into 
Sinai to develop the tourist infrastructure, the mining, oil and gas industries, the Bedouins – as well 
as the Palestinian refugees in and around Al Arish, Rafah and Sheikh Zuwayed – were as far as  
possible  excluded  from  this  development.  Accordingly,  except  for  areas  in  the  South  where 
Bedouins  were successful  in  taking part  in  the tourist  industry,  there were few legal  means of 
providing ones own income. As Mossab Abu Fagr, a Bedouin activist from North Sinai puts it, “The 
Egyptian government does not offer us anything. Even out water is bad and our customs and tribal 
laws have been ruined so it's no wonder that many people here have turned into outlaws over the 
years. All of this is because of the absence of any real development plan that the government should 
have presented as soon as they regained Sinai” (Al Jazeera 2010).
The region's  importance for Egypt is twofold: economically and strategically. Economically, 
firstly, Sinai hosts several famous tourist locations like Sharm El-Sheikh and the Santa Katarina 
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monastery and prior to the revolution produced about  30% of Egypt's  incomes stemming from 
tourism (Egyptian Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation 2013). Second, gas and oil 
have been discovered in the peninsular and are increasingly being exploited.  Discoveries of oil 
reserves are still ongoing, and in June 2011 the discovery of a new oil field in South Sinai was 
announced (Israel National News 11.06.2011). Third, Sinai constitutes the east bank of the Suez 
canal, which is another main income source to Egypt. The Suez canal of course is also of immense 
strategic importance to Egypt, its allies and international trade in general and the guaranteeing of a 
save passage through the canal is essential. Furthermore, the security in Sinai – and therefore at 
Israel's southern border – is of utmost importance for the maintenance of the Israeli-Egyptian peace 
agreement and, in relation to that, also to the ongoing flow of American aid, above all to Egypt's 
armed forces.
5. Shared Characteristics between North and South: similar opportunities for violence?
North and South Sinai are treated here as most-similar cases as they share a number of 
characteristics. They share similar terrain characteristics, an NVP and Bedouin population, the local 
population's  interests  in  both parts  have been largely neglected  by the central  government,  the 
particularly  disadvantaged  situation  of  the  indigenous  Bedouin  population,  similar  levels  of 
demilitarization, the availability of guns, and similar targets available to potential attackers. Also, 
suffice to say, they are in the same country and thereby in the same context of general political 
change and instability. These similarities allow for an analysis of the two as most likely cases.
The  first  and  most  obvious  similarity  between  North  and  South  Sinai  is  the  similar 
opportunities and constraints enforced upon the actors by the terrain. The terrain of the peninsula is 
above  all  characterized  by  empty  and  deserted  mountains,  both  in  the  North  and  the  South. 
Mountainous terrain is generally seen as facilitating the occurrence of rebellions or civil wars given 
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the  difficulty  for  the  state  to  control  the  territory.  The territory is  largely uninhabited  and the 
majority of the population, as well as the centers of state control, are limited to several towns and 
the  checkpoints  along  the  few  streets  connecting  the  different  centers.  In  particular  in  the 
mountains,  the  state  has  almost  no  presence  and truly controlling  the  territory there  is  almost  
impossible for Egyptian security apparatus given the restrictions of the peace agreement with Israel. 
While this lack of control is a common theme in the reporting on Northern Sinai, the lack of control 
also constitutes a reality in the South. 
A second similarity can be found in the general neglect of the interests of local people by the 
ruling Egyptian elites. Instead, the question of how to deal with Sinai was subjected to an ongoing 
securitization of the issue. Both the governors of North Sinai and South Sinai since 1982 are former  
military generals whose expertise accordingly is not in the fields of health care, education, or rural 
development but security and military issues. As a result of the securitization the actual needs of the 
local population – education,  health care,  and legal opportunities to make an income – are not 
adequately addressed. This reality is also reflected in the locals' opinions in the South of Sinai. An 
owner of one of the tourist camps to the North of Nuweiba (an area that is still resisting the big  
scale plans of foreign hotel companies) remarked regarding the Development plans from Cairo for 
Sinai, “They are useless, nobody asked me and I don't know anybody who was asked. The actual 
concerns and needs of the local population are not at all incorporated into these plans from Cairo” 
(Interview 1). Although development of Sinai appeared on the agenda of Egypt's new rulers after 
the revolution (Metwali and Mansour 17.08.2011), those promises did not materialize afterward.
The  Bedouins,  which  constitute  the  indigenous  population  of  Sinai  in  particular  are 
disadvantaged by the Egyptian government. Aside from oppression by the security regime and the 
exclusion from legal sources of incomes, land ownership constitutes a major issue with “Bedouins 
constantly  complaining  about  …  land  ownership  procedures  and  NVP  receiving  preferential 
treatment” (DPA 21.09.2011).  Former Prime Minister Kamal al-Ganzouri for example met  with 
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Sinai  tribal  elders  in  spring  2012  and  “agreed  to  projects  for  agriculture,  railroads  and 
landownership” (Al Masry Al Youm 13.02.2012). Only shortly later, also the military leadership, 
represented by Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, promised that the armed forces would allocate 250 
million  Egyptian  pounds  (about  27  million  Euros)  “toward  implementing  urgent  development 
projects in the peninsula (Egypt Independent 27.05.2012). Despite plans of this sort – from both 
civilian  and military representatives – to reform the land ownership laws and further develop the 
peninsula to everybody's benefit, not much progress has been achieved in this regard. 
Amongst the Bedouins, opinions on whether they are truly Egyptian differ widely. While 
one Bedouin for example fiercely resisted to any distinction, “The Upper Egyptians, The Sahara 
people,  the  Nile  Valley  people,  the  Fellahin  (farmers),  the  Bedouins,  we  all  together  are  the 
Egyptian people” (Interview 2), others only a few kilometers away did not hesitate to tell about 
their mountains, in which Egyptians don't dare to set foot (Informal Discussion 1). Clearly however, 
by the government they are perceived more as a threat to Egypt than as fellow Egyptians. Osama al-
Ghazali Harb, president of the Democratic Front Party strongly criticized the ousted regime for 
“insisting on marginalizing Sinai and looking down on Bedouins to the point of oppressing them” 
(Egypt Independent 16.03.2011). Bedouin tribal leaders during one of the first conferences of tribal 
leaders in Sinai after the end of Mubarak's rule in particular called for “the abolition of restrictions 
on investments in Sinai, the implementation of a genuine development program in Sinai, and the 
reversing of rulings issued against Sinai residents” (Ibid.). Furthermore, “allowing Bedouins land 
ownership and treating them on equal footing with Egyptians” were key demands brought forward 
(Ibid.). 
After 1982, distrust against the Bedouins and their perceived cooperation with Israel was 
high. In this regard it  is important to highlight that the political reality in Sinai during the last 
century was marked by repeated shifts of authority – from British dominance to Egyptian, to Israeli, 
and back to  Egyptian  –  which  resulted  in  the  need for  the  indigenous people  to  adjust  to  the 
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respective rulers. In particular following the  overwhelming defeat of the Egyptian forces in 1967, it 
was all but certain that Sinai indeed would be returned to Egypt and not remain part of Israel, which 
already  hosts  a  number  of  Bedouins  in  the  Negev  desert  (Informal  Discussion  2).  Generally 
speaking, studies of tribal societies and their relationship to the modern states argue that there is a 
permanent tension between the tribes on the one hand, and the state on the other hand. This tension 
is “dynamic and variable rather than static and stable” (TAC 2009). They identify a “fundamental 
conflict between any central  authority which seeks to impose national unity and the centrifugal 
forces  of  a  tribal  society as  a  whole whose ideals  and way of  live  depend upon untrammeled 
freedom from external  restraints  and  demands”  (Ibid.).  This  tension,  as  said,  is  not  static  but 
depends on a  certain balance between the central  authorities  and the tribes,  for example under 
strong leadership or central authorities with a proper understanding of the tribal society. However, 
the balance can be destroyed in times of political turmoil or by external intervention. The ousting of 
Hosni  Mubarak and the  subsequent  power vacuum fit  this  description.  As a  study about  tribal 
dynamics goes on, “as soon as they [the tribes] perceive weakness or vacillation on the central 
government, the tribes would rise in defiance” (Ibid.). During these times, in tribal areas there will 
be “violent confrontations ranging from local disturbances to civil war” (Ibid.). 
Another similarity can be found in the fact that both North and South Sinai constitute parts 
of the same demilitarized zones. The entire area south of the border (North Sinai), as well as the 
entire eastern coast of the peninsular (South Sinai) are part of the completely demilitarized zone C. 
This translates into equal opportunities and constraints for the Egyptian security forces in those 
parts of North and South Sinai. Similarly it means that possible attackers are presented with similar 
targets of state authority in both parts of Sinai: police stations, checkpoints, and patrolling police 
cars.
One  more  critical  issue  is  the  availability  of  arms  to  possible  attackers.  Following  the 
uprising against Mubarak in early 2011 and in particular following the downfall of Muammar al 
24
Gadafi in Libya, a strong increase in the influx of arms could be observed (Reuters 22.07.2011).  
“By mid-2011, tribal leaders in Sinai claimed they had amassed sufficient weaponry – medium-
range as well as light arms – to outgun the army” (Pelham 2012: 13). Information in that regard is  
scarce and intuitively, due to its location next to Gaza, it can be assumed that more weapons are 
available in the North. However, also in the South light arms are available in a large quantity. One 
group of young Bedouin in Nuweiba for example did not hesitate to show pictures on their mobile 
phones of themselves with AK 47 and Cal. 50 Machine guns attached to a pick-up truck. One of the 
Bedouin explained, “Of course we have guns, the Egyptian state provides no protection and police 
is lazy or just there to harass us” (Informal Discussion 1). Another one remarked, “All this is in the 
mountains, that is our land, we play with our toys there and the Egyptians do not dare to come and 
disturb us” (Ibid.). Without intense research it is not clear as to how many arms, and which kinds 
are available in the South, but based on some discussions and the information available it is safe to 
say that at least small arms are indeed available in the South. In a press meeting also South Sinai 
governor General Khaled Fouda told that the spread of arms among the Bedouin in South Sinai is a 
major problem and added that disarming them is “impossible” and trying to do so would “drown the 
area in a blood bath” (Al-Masry Al-Youm 15.04.2012). Considering that most of the attacks in the 
North are conducted with small arms weapons – and keeping in mind that both parts are equally 
demilitarized and thereby would offer similar resistance by state authorities – one arrives at the 
conclusion, that the availability of arms constitutes another similarity.
Last but not least, the proximity to Israel is often pointed out as a big difference between 
North and South Sinai. No doubt, plenty of Israeli targets are in reach of rockets or even small guns 
from  North  Sinai.  However,  this  observation  can  be  misleading  because,  and  despite  Israeli 
campaigns to prevent this, still a number of Israeli tourists is visiting South Sinai, in particular the 
hippy-style camps to the North of Nuweiba. For example, in one camp alone in May 2013 there 
were three individual Israeli tourists, as well as one Israeli family including two children, and all of  
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them were of Jewish, not Palestinian background. Samy Mahmoud, a senior official at the Egyptian 
Tourist  Authority  in  August  2011 explained  in  an  article  in  Al-Masry Al-Youm,  “nearly 2.000 
Israelis had entered Egypt since the unrest began” and added “Israeli visitors are usually indifferent 
to  their  government's  warnings” (Al-Masry Al-Youm 21.08.2011).  Therefore,  the availability of 
Israeli targets constitutes another similarity between North and South Sinai that is often overlooked. 
Not only are there also Israeli targets available in the South, the unprotected civilians there would 
constitute far easier targets than those behind the well guarded and walled off border in the North.
6. Developments in Sinai February 2011 until February 2013
In order to address the question why there is more violence in North Sinai, it is first of all 
necessary to clearly establish that there in fact is a stark difference in that regard despite the above-
mentioned shared characteristics. As no comprehensive summaries about violent incidents in Sinai 
since 2011 are available, this thesis relies on a large number of newspaper articles to establish such 
an  overview.  Therefore,  about  250  articles  about  Sinai  from  the  English  versions  of  Arabic 
newspapers  Al-Masry Al Youm, Al-Ahram, Al Jazeera,  as well  as articles from DPA, AFP and 
Reuters  have been collected. The resulting overview does not claim to comprehend all incidents 
that occurred in the 24 months between February 2011 and February 2013, but by cross checking 
the articles against each others I assume that most incidents having actually led to casualties are 
incorporated. The following brief table lists how many incidents in North Sinai (NS) and South 
Sinai (SS) occurred in the respective period and to how many casualties they led.  Incidents counted 
are all events involving forms of violence by either side. Casualties are divided into those on the 
side of the security forces, militants and smugglers, and others (involving Egyptian civilians and 
Bedouins which cannot be clearly associated with militant groups or smugglers). A complete list of 
all incidents with a short description can be found in the annex.
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North Sinai South Sinai
Recorded Incidents 77 14
Security Forces 97 2
Militants and Smugglers 48 0
Others 48 2
Total Casualties 193 4
The results of this overview reveals a clear difference between North Sinai and South Sinai. 
First, there were more than five times as many incidents counted in North Sinai than in South Sinai 
(77 : 14). Furthermore, and revealing an even starker difference, the security forces suffered more 
than 45 times as many casualties in the North than in the South (97 : 2). This strong difference can 
also be observed in regard to casualties on the side of militants and smugglers (48 : 0) and others 
(48 : 2). This pattern confirms the suspected differences in regard to the occurrence of violence 
between North Sinai and South Sinai. In a next step, the recorded incidents are grouped into attacks 
of different types to gain further insights into the dynamics in Sinai.
Type North Sinai South Sinai
Militant or Radical Islamic 
background
25 0
Fighting between locals 4 1
Kidnappings 2 5
Unclear Fights between 
Security Forces and Assailants
35 6
Smuggling-related incidents 9 0
Other 2 2
Total 77 14
First of all,  it  is clear that smuggling plays a major role in the North of Sinai given its 
location  next  to  the  isolated  Gaza  strip  and that  the  violence  deriving  from these  activities  is  
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unlikely to occur in the South. Also in regard to kidnappings, the available information is quite clear 
and indicates that the kidnappers both in North and South above all attempted to exercise pressure 
on the government to release detained relatives or friends. Considering that, as one Egyptian in 
South Sinai put it, if they kidnap an Egyptian, nobody in the government cares, it makes sense that 
above all foreigners (tourists in the South, MFO members and foreign workers in the North) are 
getting kidnapped to exercise pressure on the government (Interview 1).  However,  none of the 
kidnapped foreigners was hurt (AFP 19.03.2012). To the contrary, two American women told after 
their release that “their kidnappers gave them tea and dried fruit and talked about religion and tribal 
rights” and one kidnapper even “put out his cigarette in the car when a hostage said the smoke was 
bothering  her”  (AP 05.02.2012).  Most  interesting  however,  considering  the  striking  differences 
between North and South, are those incidents clearly related to extremism and radical Islam (25 : 0), 
fighting between locals (4 : 1), as well as the high number of small, largely ineffective and with 
unclear motives, occurring attacks on security forces (35 : 6).
7. Explaining the differences
I  argue that  several  factors in  particular  are  suited to  explain the illustrated differences. 
When looking at the acts of violence in the North, it is  reasonably obvious that most of the violence 
cannot be traced back to a larger organization engaging in coordinated attacks. Rather the majority 
of attacks, in particular on the security forces, are uncoordinated and ineffective as only a minority 
of  them actually led  to  casualties  on the  side  of  the security forces.  These attacks  usually are 
described in newspaper articles as 'unidentified gunmen attack security forces'. 
 In the following sections I will engage in evidence gathering and address each of the above-
mentioned  factors.  First,  structural  elements  will  be  addressed,  secondly  politically  motivated 
violence, and third economically driven violence. Subsequently – although some elements will have 
appeared earlier – societal cohesion in South Sinai will be addressed before briefly illustrating the 
28
different experiences with Israeli occupation that provide further insight into the dynamics. I argue 
that the nonviolence in the South is a rational decision by the people there acting as an entity 
although they are not really one, whereas the violence in North Sinai is a mix of different actions by 
different actors with diverging interests.
7.1. Structural Elements
Socio-Economic Structures
An initial factor to be mentioned here that shapes the different outcomes are the different 
socio-economic  structures.  Whereas  people  in  South  Sinai  are  fairly  wealthy,  poverty  is  much 
higher in the North. Although the North has received some development aid and factories were 
constructed there, only a fraction of the population – mainly the NVP – benefit from the resulting 
work opportunities while both Palestinians and Bedouins are excluded as far as possible. As Middle 
East researcher and author Dona Stewart explains, mining for example is one of the main sources of 
income in the North, but the Bedouin are largely excluded (BBC 12.11.12). “Major cement factories 
use Chinese workers,” she says (Ibid.). The frustration this generates among the local population 
can be seen for example in the case of the kidnapping of 25 Chinese workers by local Bedouins in  
January 2012 (Reuters 01.02.2012). An end to unemployment was also one of the main demands of 
the  Bedouin  protesters  during  the  uprising  of  February  2011  (Egypt  Independent  20.02.2011). 
Conversely in the South, while also being excluded often from the job opportunities in the resorts 
that emerged during the recent decades, the Bedouins  have still been able to carve out a niche in the 
tourism industry and participate  to  some extent  in  the wealth created there.  Consequently,  this 
increases of course the general level of frustration in the North and therefore opposition to the 
government,  and  this  also  offers  increased  opportunities  for  outsiders  or  criminals  to  buy  off 
individual locals to cooperate with them. 
29
Political Opportunities and Constraints
A second factor to be considered are the political opportunities and constraints with which 
the groups in North and South  are each confronted. The focus lies here on the system of state 
oppression. I argue that the security regime in North Sinai was far tighter than in the South and 
subjected the local population to a brutal regime of oppression. The higher violence in the North 
therefore, is a consequence of people's higher exposure to violence. Some Bedouins from North 
Sinai for example were arrested in 2006 and 2007 for alleged participation in the Sinai bombings of 
the previous years, but remained detained without trial since then (Egypt Independent 20.02.2011). 
Comparable  to  the  Israeli  security  in  the  North  and  the  administrative  lens  in  the  South,  the 
Egyptian state followed a similar approach. Given the requirement to maintain stability in North 
Sinai, in order to maintain the Peace agreement with Israel, and thereby maintaining the flow of  
American military aid to the Egyptian Army, the state engaged in a harsh oppression regime. In the 
South, however,  this was not possible to such a high degree given the presence of foreign tourists.  
In the North however, Bedouins involved in smuggling, the Gaza tunnel traffickers, and Islamists 
were  all   subjected  to  the  same  harsh  treatment,  in  particular  following  the  sweep  after  the 
bombings of 2004 – 2006. Michael Hanna said “there is a level of discrimination involved, an 
adversarial  relationship  with  the  Bedouin  in  Sinai.  That  dysfunctional  relation  has  produced  a 
security mindset in how authorities deal with the Bedouin” (AFP 18.03.2012). Furthermore, the 
oppressed groups in the North are more disconnected from the political center as they share no 
significant  ties  with  the  NVP population  in  North  Sinai  as  a  result  of  the  exclusion  from the  
economic system. In the South however, the relationship between indigenous Bedouins and NVP is 
more pronounced given both groups' participation in the tourism sector.
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7.2. Political Violence
Part of the violence can be clearly traced back to radical Islamist and anti-Israeli motives. 
Two main reasons can be found for this; firstly, the relations of North Sinai to the Gaza strip and 
Hamaz and the resulting influence of more radical ideologies. Secondly, and perhaps even more 
importantly, North Sinai emerged as a safe haven for fugitives of the state, radicals and criminals. 
Both elements, which also undermine group cohesion in the North are not present in the South.
The  rise  of  Islamism and  radical  ideologies  in  Sinai  is  more  than  preventable  because 
traditionally, Bedouin tribal structures with their informal case to case rulings and their adherence to 
customary  law  are  in  stark  contrast  to  radical  Islamist  ideology  and  its  strict  and  inflexible 
application of Sharia law. As Nicolas Pelham points out,  the current climate in Sinai, however,  
fosters the spread of Islamism (Pelham 2012). Following the election victory of Hamas in Gaza in 
2006, the new government first had to focus above all on the day to day businesses of governing in  
the Gaza Strip but since 2008 increasingly became active toward the Sinai. In 2008, and supported 
by the locals in North Sinai, Hamas unilaterally opened the border to Egypt and allowed its citizens 
to cross. This however was contained as far as possible by the Egyptian security forces who thereby 
once more got into conflict with the local population (Pelham 2012). Subsequently, also the trade 
between North Sinai and Gaza continued to rise and Sinai had replaced Israel as main source of 
basic goods for Gaza by 2010. This not only increased the amount of interactions between people 
from the two areas, but also led to a growing dependency of parts of the people in North Sinai on  
the trade with Gaza. As Nicolas Pelham sums up, “the collapse of Egypt's security regime and 
Israel's economic retreat from Sinai, coupled with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas 
influence, undoubtedly created space for the growth of Islamism in the region”” (Pelham 2012: 20).  
Hamas'  precise involvement in North Sinai however remains unclear.  While on the one hand it  
makes sense that radical elements from Gaza play a role in North Sinai, Hamas itself has no real  
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interest in further alienating the Egyptian state. Following the Arish police station attack in July 
2011,  Hamas  responded to  Egypt's  demands  to  crack  down on the  radical  Army of  Islam and 
attempted to arrest their leader Mimtaz Daghmash (Egypt Independent 18.08.2011).
The advantages of Sinai as a retreat for Islamists not only from Gaza, but from across Egypt 
is rather obvious: low level of state presence in large parts of the territory, difficult terrain, and a  
population in large parts alienated from the government. Essential in regard to Islamist penetration 
of the peninsular other than from Gaza, is the so called jailbreak during the Egyptian revolution in  
early 2011. Many Egyptian Islamists who had been detained by the Mubarak regime got out of 
prison and sought refuge in Sinai, in the beginning in particular in and around Mount Halal in North 
Sinai where they could act more or less unhindered by the security forces. “Many jihadists were 
released from jail bringing into the area many years of experience, knowledge, courage and people 
who actually do not have anything to lose” said Israeli counter-terrorism expert Nitzan Nuriel in 
reference  to  the  jailbreak  of  February  2011  (Reuters  15.09.2011).  Despite  “more  than  2.000 
additional policemen and several armored military vehicles stationed around security premises in 
North Sinai”, North Sinai Governor Mabrouk said in August 2011, “the security deployment is for 
defense purposes only. We are not chasing anyone in the mountains” (DPA 12.08.2011). Israel in 
this case for the first time since 1979 – except for the 750 soldiers allowed to secure the border  
crossing in Rafah – gave the green light for additional Egyptian troops in North Sinai (Ahmed Abu 
Draa 15.08.2011). This environment of course facilitated the movement of further radicals into the 
region. As mentioned, Bedouins traditionally were worried of radical Islamism, but “ the Bedouin's 
shared experience of Egyptian jail with salafis, a separatist spirit enhanced by opposition to the old 
security regime, and the new economic opportunities all appear to have helped forge a common 
outlook, which continued after the 2011 jailbreak” (Pelham 2012: 21). 
Subsequently, unhindered by the collapsed security forces, and building on their growing 
relationship with parts of the Bedouins, “Al-Daawa wal-sunna and other Salafi groups ventured 
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from  the  hinterland  into  the  coastal  towns,  establishing  a  niche  by  forming  neighborhood 
committees and offering fledgling Sharia courts as an alternative judicial process in the wake of the 
collapse  of  the  central  authority”  (Pelham  2012:  22).  Osama  Khaled  and  Salah  El  Boluk, 
researchers  on  Sinai,  explain  that  the  Salafi  Group  in  North  Sinai,  an  umbrella  organization 
coordinating  different  Salafis  across  North  Sinai  has  announced  the  establishment  of  such 
committees in  Rafah,  Al-Arish and Sheikh Zuwayed (Khaled and El  Boluk 09.08.2011).  These 
committees are also employing force in order to implement its rulings as co-founder of the Salafi  
Group in North Sinai Suleiman Abu Ayoub confirms. “We will deploy some 6.000 of our youths to 
implement  verdicts  by  armed  force  in  the  absence  of  the  government”  (Ibid.).  Although  the 
allegations and extent of the influence of Salafi and other radical movements in North Sinai is 
difficult to confirm, the results of the parliamentary elections in autumn 2011 in Egypt offer one 
clear indicator for their presence in the North, and also their inexistence in the South. Both North 
and South Sinai, disregarding their different population sizes, provide four representatives to the 
Egyptian parliament. In both districts, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood – the Freedom 
and Justice Party – won two of the four seats. Furthermore the Reform and Development Party, one 
of the liberal parties, was able to secure one seat. The fourth seat, however, went to quite different 
groups in the two regions. In South Sinai, the fourth seat was taken by the national liberal Al-Wafd 
party which as one of their key positions has the maintenance of Egyptian unity and the inclusion of 
Christians in its party – also represented by the cross and the crescent in its logo. In North Sinai  
however,  the  fourth  seat  was  taken  by  the  radical  salafi  Hisb  al-Nour  party,  which  aims  at 
establishing a new Islamic Egypt based on Sharia law and the strict dominance of Islamic values. 
The Salafi's position on violence is extremely unclear. Hussein al-Qayem, a member of the 
Salafi Group in North Sinai in response to the alleged involvement of Salafis participation in the 
attack on a police station in Arish leaving four dead and numerous injured emphasized “that no 
innocent Muslim should ever be killed, regardless of the reason” (MENA 02.08.2011). However, 
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this statement is twofold flawed in regard to the denunciation of violence. Firstly, it relates only to 
Muslims and thereby excludes the Egyptian Christians.  Secondly,  the term 'innocent'  is entirely 
open to interpretation. Furthermore, it is difficult to estimate how much control the leading Salafi 
party, the Hisb al-Nour, actually has in Sinai. At least officially, the party committed to the Camp 
David Accords with Israel. In an interview with Israeli radio, Yousry Hammad, the spokesman of 
the Hisb al-Nour stated “the treaty is  binding because Egypt  has signed it”,  but added that the 
Egyptian people are aiming to adjust certain articles to be able to exercise better control in Sinai 
(Hamdi Dabash 20.12.2011). 
The differences between North and South were also visible, for example, during an election 
campaign tour to Sinai of liberal candidate Hamdeen Sabahhi. While the trip went without problems 
in the South, the group received death threats when entering the North and a trip to Sheikh Zuwayed 
was cancelled at the request of tribal leaders there, who were not able to guarantee his security 
during  the  visit  (Egypt  Independent  26.04.2012).  The  presence  of  radical  Islamist  elements  in 
Northern Sinai is also visible in the aggression the Coptic Christian community faces in Northern 
Sinai. Immediately after the revolution radicals used the security vacuum to instigate first attacks on 
several Coptic churches in the North. As reported by Reuters, in mid February armed men broke 
into  one  church  in  North  Sinai  and stole  furniture  and  other  equipment  while  two more  such 
attempts  were thwarted by the remaining forces of the Egyptian army as well as locals (Reuters  
13.02.2011). The tensions further escalated and the subsequent incidents against Coptic Egyptians 
in North Sinai, according to political activist Wael Khalil illustrate “the inability and failure of the  
state to protect its citizens” (Egypt Independent 28.09.2012). The incidents mentioned by Khalil 
are an increasingly aggressive rhetoric the Coptic minority in North Sinai faces, cumulating in a 
series of death threats and orders to leave the area (Ibid.). The threats, which were further backed up 
with concrete action by radicals who “fired at stores owned by Christians” (Ibid.). The threats did 
not remain without aftereffects and the Egyptian political activist and novelist Mosaad Abu Fagr 
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reports  that  he  “received  100 percent  authentic  information  that  Christians  left  Rafah  in  Sinai 
because of death threats from groups” (Ibid.). 
Other incidents that can be clearly traced back to radicals are the repeated attacks on the gas 
pipeline that transported Egyptian gas to Israel until the agreement was canceled after the fifteenth 
attack – officially due to a business rather than a political dispute (Reuters 23.04.2012). “We won't 
allow gas to be exported to Israel” was the message written in sand next to one of the sites attacked 
(Yousry el-Badri et al.  11.11.2011). Amongst the seven bombers were also two Bedouin (Ibid.). 
Mohamed al-Teehi, a member of the armed Islamist group Al-Takfir Wa Al-Hijra was arrested as 
mastermind behind the attacks on the Arish police station as well  as on the pipelines (Reuters 
13.11.2011).  Residents of Al-Arish confirmed that  he was a  leading member of a “well-known 
religious current” (Ibid.). He is also said to have had links to Al Qaeda (Osama Khaled 14.11.2011). 
That the radicals however not only are a homegrown Egyptian problem, but that a part of their core 
group  also  comes  from  abroad  was  clearly  visible  during  an  incident  in  Al-Arish  as  local 
eyewitnesses told Reuters news agency. The incident occurred in July 2011 when “about 100 armed 
men rode through the town of Arish on motorcycles and in cars, waving flags with Islamic slogans 
and firing in the air” (Reuters 30.07.2011). Afterward, they attacked a police station and killed one 
police officer and three civilians. Although the identity of the attackers is not clearly known as most 
wore masks, eyewitnesses are convinced that they are not from the area as they “lost their way 
several times before reaching the police station” (Ibid.). Aref Abu Atta, the leader of the Akkour 
tribe in North Sinai agrees and said that the “scattered radical groups … have been mostly formed 
and inspired by elements from outside Sinai, particularly leaders of Islamist groups in Upper and 
Lower Egypt who detainees from Sinai met in prison” (Lina Attalah 04.07.2012). Several dozen 
people were arrested in connection with this incident, some of them being Palestinian, but their 
precise role and the question under whose guidance the attack was planned is still unclear (Salah 
Elboluk 31.07.2011). According to Egyptian security sources, the perpetrators were members of 
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Islamist groups as well as smugglers (Osama Khaled 12.09.2011). Subsequently in another raid by 
security  forces,  two  more  radicals  were  arrested  who,  according  to  Egyptian  sources,  ran  a 
workshop producing explosives (Egypt Independent 17.08.2011). During the raid the security forces 
“seized eight bombs, three rocket-propelled grenades, black flags with religious slogans, tools used 
in making explosives such as ball bearings and a jar containing a chemical mixture used in making 
explosives” (Ibid.). 
The key event within this chain of violent incidents is without a doubt the attack of radical  
militants against an Egyptian border post close to the Abu Salem border crossing in Northern Sinai. 
The attackers, who according to residents of the surrounding houses, came in three cars, attacked a 
group of soldiers who were just getting to break their Ramadan feast and killed a total of sixteen 
soldiers. Subsequently, they stole a military tank stationed at the border post and crossed into Israeli 
territory, where they were killed by a rocked fired from an Israeli aircraft shortly after crossing the 
border (Hefa Abify 07.08.2012). The fact that the attackers immediately attempted to cross into 
Israeli territory and thereby were willing to march into certain death highlights the radical nature of  
the attackers. The incident at the same time is a striking example of the failure and weakness of the 
Egyptian state in North Sinai and led to the initiation of Operation Eagle. Operation Eagle was the 
largest Egyptian military operation in Northern Sinai since 1973 and involved the deployment of 
heavy tanks, gunship helicopters and fighting jets to the area – against the rules of the Camp-David 
accords, but with the blessing of the Israeli government. Within one month, 32 radicals were killed 
and another 58 arrested by the Egyptian army in North Sinai (Ahmed Abu Draa 09.09.2012).
The violent  approach followed by some,  however,  is  not  at  all  supported  by the whole 
population, which also leads to conflicts between the more violent groups and those opposing the 
violence. On the one hand, parts of the Bedouins are actively supporting the Egyptian forces in their 
crack down, in particular after the 05.08.2012 attacks. On the other hand, radicals commit attacks 
against those denouncing the violence and supporting the Egyptian state. Only one incident of the 
36
second type – radicals attacking those committed to maintaining peace and nonviolence – could be 
found in the corpus of newspaper articles and secondary literature; however, this was an important 
find. Following the 05.08.2012 attacks and in parallel to Operation Eagle launched by the Egyptian 
security forces, tribal leaders in North Sinai attempted to take action on their own to prevent a  
further escalation and initiated a  dialogue amongst them. This  however was of course strongly 
opposed by the radical elements who reacted in their own manner. “Tribal leader Khalaf al-Menahy 
and his son were shot dead by militants on their way back from a conference organized by tribal 
leaders to denounce militancy” a security source in Sinai reported to Reuters (Reuters 13.08.2012).
The attack on an Egyptian border post on August 5th 2012, causing the death of 16 Egyptian 
soldiers  not  only  constitutes  the  key  event  that  led  to  the  initiation  of  the  Egyptian  military 
response, as well as seemingly the only large-scale, well organized action by radicals in Northern 
Sinai. It also illustrates the prevailing loyalty of a large part of the population to the Egyptian state 
and their opposition to radicalism. Locals, first of all, faced with total inactivity of the Egyptian 
forces in the region were the firsts to arrive at the scene, treat the wounded soldiers, and bring the 
wounded to hospital in Al-Arish. Bassam Ouda, one of the locals first at the site complains, “We 
told the officers to come secure us while we got the injured soldiers. They refused, saying that they 
didn't  receive  such orders  and couldn't  desert  their  posts”  (Heba Afify 07.08.2012).  While  the 
military was slow to act, Mohamed al-Moattar, a resident from Rafah reported that actually the 
“members of local tribes were still chasing the attackers on the loose” (Ibid.). As he puts it, “this has 
always been Sinai's version of law enforcement, which lacks any reliance on the police” (Ibid.). As 
Heba Afify, one of the reporters first at the site reported, “locals who witnessed the attack grieved  
the  loss  of  the  soldiers  whom,  according  to  Bedouin  traditions,  they  considered  themselves 
responsible to protect” (Ibid.). Also before and after the attack, parts of the Bedouins in North Sinai 
actively cooperated with the security forces in order to counter the rise of radicalism. Abdallah 
Gohama, leader of the influential Tarabeen tribe and top tribal leader in Central Sinai said, “that 
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Sinai  Bedouin  chiefs  warned military leadership  about  militancy in  Sinai  before  the  attack  on 
security  forces  that  left  at  least  16  dead  and  seven  injured”  (Egypt  Independent  08.08.2012). 
Gohama also said that himself and other influential tribal leaders “warned Armed Forces leadership 
more than four months ago about the dangers of the spread of extremist groups in Sinai and told the  
authorities  that  the  situation  is  critical”  (Egypt  Independent  07.08.2012).  Local  Bedouins  were 
subsequently  integrated  by  the  security  forces  in  their  crackdown  and  also  after  the  end  of 
Operation Eagle joint operations of Egyptian armed forces and local Bedouins have continued. In 
December 2012 for example, in a joint operation carried out to intercept an arms transport in North 
Sinai seventeen rockets were confiscated (MENA 24.12.2012). This integration of Bedouins into 
official security operations was preceded by private companies hiring Bedouins for the protection of 
their industrial facilities. The companies working in the gas sector and managing the gas pipeline to 
Israel and Jordan already in summer 2011 contracted Bedouin tribes – through whose territories the 
pipeline runs – to protect the facilities as North Sinai Governor Abdel Wahab Mabrouk confirmed 
(DPA 01.08.2011). One last incident that illustrates the escalation of tensions between the different 
interest groups in the North, and of all incidents recorded by far the most brutal and disturbing, 
occurred in September 2012 in the Muqatta area in North Sinai. There, Egyptian police discovered 
the  decapitated  head  “of  a  man  kidnapped  by  Islamist  militants,  reportedly  for  his  role  in 
assassinating an extremist” (AFP 01.09.2012). This was confirmed by a Bedouin source who further 
explained “the militants behind Manazil's [the beheaded Egyptian] kidnapping accused him and 
several other men of planting a booby trap to assassinate Ouda Bereikat” (Ibid.). Ouda Bereikat was 
the head of a group of militants in North Sinai, reportedly also responsible for firing rockets on 
Israeli territory (Ibid.).
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7.3. Economically motivated violence
Another part of the violence can be traced back to economic motives. Those, I argue are a 
result  of  the involvement  of certain groups in illegal activities in the North,  most importantly 
smuggling of arms and other goods to Gaza, as well as human trafficking – or e Israeli defense wall 
along the border to Sinai (AFP 12.12.2011), the selling of organs of immigrants who get as far as 
Sinai but then fall into the hands of ruthless gangs. 
The smuggling of goods and arms from Sinai into Gaza constitutes an issue in the area since 
1948 and in particular became an issue after Egypt regained authority in Sinai in 1982.  Firstly,  
having few legal sources of income available, smuggling constituted a lucrative business for the 
people of Rafah and Al Arish.  Second, the presence of the Palestinian refugees in  North Sinai 
provided personal links to the buyers in Gaza. Third, the smuggling of arms in particular was not 
only lucrative, but has also to be seen in the context of Arab struggle against Israel. Smuggling, 
however, is limited in the amount of money it can provide and a fierce competition over the control 
of the smuggling routes emerged. Today, most of the smuggling tends to be controlled by several  
families (Sawarka, Rumaylat, and Tarabeen) who sometimes cooperate with particular factions in 
Gaza (ICG 2007: 8).
Aside  from  goods,  the  North  of  Sinai  constitutes  a  major  route  of  human  trafficking. 
Africans who get to Egypt try to get to Israeli from here. However, and in particular since Israel 
finished the construction of its defense wall towards Sinai (Reuters 02.02.2013), more and more of 
the African migrants who get smuggled into Sinai are held hostage there to blackmail their families 
for more money or get killed if no further payments are possible. As Sigal Rozen, Israeli NGO 
worker in the field of immigration put it in an interview in Der Spiegel, “Whole valleys in Sinai  
smell like death and decay”, as dozens if not hundreds of Africans get killed there every year while 
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trying to escape their imprisonment (Der Spiegel 03.09.2011). According to Israeli sources at least 
10.000 African migrants have made their way through Sinai across the border into Israel during 
recent years (DPA 24.05.2011). The business is again divided between criminal gangs and Islamic 
militants, who control who is allowed to pass through the mountains of North Sinai and who is not 
(Ibid.). The illegal economic activities in two ways lead to violence in North Sinai. On the one 
hand, obviously, some of the shooting at the border can be traced back to confrontations between 
smugglers and security forces. On the other hand, the activities are also disputed amongst the local 
population who compete for bigger shares, or try to prevent others from engaging in these activities.
First, violence erupts from clashes between smugglers and security forces along the border 
between Egypt and Israel. Right after the uprising in 2011, a first member of the security forces was 
shot when he was trying to prevent a “group of masked smugglers with sacks of drugs attempting to 
infiltrate  Israel”  from  crossing  the  border  (Egypt  Independent  24.02.2011).  Not  only  drug 
smugglers, but also human traffickers clash with security forces, and October 2011 for example 
shooting between armed forces and smugglers broke out close to Rafah where an “officer was shot 
and injured after  an encounter  with a  gang attempting to smuggle African migrants into Israel 
(MENA 25.10.2011). 
Second, these lucrative and illegal activities however are also not undisputed between the 
different groups controlling them, and also subject to criticism or open confrontation by other – 
non-involved – tribes. This constitutes one of the drawbacks of the breaking down of the security 
infrastructure in North Sinai, as the competition for larger shares in the smuggling business between 
the different tribes escalated, or tribes not involved in the business attempted to take justice into 
their own hands, while at the same time the tribal structures originally mitigating these conflicts had 
suffered from increasing erosion as a result  of Egyptian state oppression.  Subsequently,  several 
tribal feuds escalated in North Sinai. In November 2011 for example, the confrontation between the 
Al-Tiaha  tribe  and  the  Al-Nakhlawa  tribe  escalated  into  fierce  gun-fighting,  with  the  former 
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accusing  the  latter   of  “smuggling  Africans  and  stealing  their  organs”  (Egypt  Independent, 
14.11.2011). One Nakhlwa tribesman was shot and another one arrested and handed over to the 
police following fierce gun battles between the two tribes. A report in the Arabic edition of Al-
Masry Al-Youm confirms  that  “traffickers  are  stealing  the  organs  of  the  refugees  they kidnap, 
adding that there were violent confrontations in central Sinai as the Al-Tiaha tribe accused members 
of the Nakhlwa tribe of stealing organs” (Carr 06.12.2011). Another escalation of tribal tensions 
occurred in May 2012 in Rafah between members of the Rumailat tribe and the Barahma tribe. 
Although the precise reasons are unclear, it is likely that conflicts about smuggling fueled the fight 
over a seemingly unimportant issue – the assumed stealing of a bike. Within hours the small hand-
fight  had  escalated  and  eyewitnesses  “said  that  machine  guns  and  RPGs  were  used  in  the 
subsequent battle” (Al-Masry Alyoum 31.05.2012). According to Palestinian sources even mortars 
were used and two shells fell into the Gaza Strip (Ibid.). Illustrating the extent of the inability of the  
regular security forces in North Sinai to contain these tensions, witnesses reported that “security 
forces have not intervened to end the clashes” while “pillars of smoke could be seen and shooting 
heard” several hours into the skirmish (Ibid.). A third incident of significant infighting between 
different Bedouin tribes in North Sinai was recorded in November 2012. Again, a minor dispute 
about cutting in line at a gas station sparked a fight which subsequently escalated into a fierce battle  
in the area west of Al-Arish.  More than twenty people were severely injured and at  least  four 
Bedouins died in the battle (Al Masry Al Youm 09.11.2012).  Those incidents of infighting in the 
North of Sinai, and the lack of similar events in South Sinai is a strong indicator of the lack of 
group cohesion, and illustrates the negative effects on the society in the North as a whole of the 
competition between different families for bigger shares of the informal economic sector.
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7.4. Societal Cohesion
In order to conceptualize societal cohesion in South Sinai I turn firstly  to the rather simple 
indicators of group size and group composition. Then, derived from Wendy Pearlman's paper on 
nonviolence in Palestine (2012), I borrow parts of the definition of cohesion commonly applied in 
natural science. There, not the size of the group or number of its members is decisive, rather the 
focus is put on the forces that bring the members together or tear them apart. Cohesion in this thesis 
then is  understood as  the result  of  those factors.  As there is  no real  movement under  specific 
leadership in Sinai, unlike in Palestine which for example is the case analyzed by Pearlman, the 
group in North Sinai and South Sinai is considered to consist of the people living in the two areas. 
The application of cohesion as a variable allows for scholars of political science to “move away 
from intellectually reifying political collectives and toward identifying the factors that allow that 
which is not actually an 'it'  to act as if it  were” (Pearlman 2012, Cox and Shepsle 2007). This  
approach fits this thesis very well and allows for the identification of the factors that allow the 
people in South Sinai almost homogeneously acting as a nonviolent group, in contrast to the group 
in North Sinai which does not possess a similar group cohesion and therefore hosts a considerable 
amount of spoilers who engage in violence.
A first factor is related to the demographic structures in the two areas, namely population 
size and population composition. The population in NS is almost three times as big as in South 
Sinai. The population in Sinai grew rapidly between 1982 and 2012. While in 1982 only about 
35.000 people inhabited the peninsular, Sinai today is home to about 500.000 people of which most 
live in  the northern coastal  plain.  However,  due to  ongoing migration of people from the Nile 
Valley, seasonal workers in the tourist sector, and unreliable figures about the precise number of 
Bedouins, it is difficult to exactly clarify this number. The International Crisis Group in a study of  
2007 estimated that the number of Bedouins in the peninsular is about 200.000, Palestinians about 
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70.000 to 100.000, with the rest being mainly Egyptians from the Nile Valley (ICG 2007). Although 
Sinai  historically  was  inhabited  by above  all  Bedouins,  the  demographic  distribution  has  been 
altered significantly in particular since the mid 1980s. The Egyptian government engaged in a large 
scale migration campaign of NVP to Northern Sinai in order to maintain control there,  without 
having to place military forces there which is largely prohibited under the Camp David Agreement. 
Between 1986 and 1996 this led to population growth in North Sinai at an annual rate of 6.7 % 
(ICG 2007). The population in Sinai, however, is highly unevenly distributed over the peninsula. 
Also today, increasing the percentage of NVP in Sinai is a major concern for the government. The 
Egyptian Irrigation Minister Hisham Qandil for example explained that the Egyptian government 
plans the relocation of another three million citizens to Sinai as part of a larger project to boost the 
peninsula's population (Metwali Salem 08.09.2011).
Secondly,  whereas  only two subgroups  live  in  South  Sinai  –  Bedouins  and NVP –  the 
Palestinian refugees constitute a third subgroup in North Sinai. Living mainly in and around the 
cities of Al-Arish, Rafah and Sheikh Zuwayed, they number up to 100.000 people or about a fourth 
of the population. The Palestinian diaspora in Sinai also maintained their specifically Palestinian 
identity and is of course strongly linked to their fellow Palestinians in the Gaza strip. On the one 
hand,  the  Palestinian  identity  is  extremely  pronounced  given  the  background  of  the  Israeli-
Palestinian  conflict  and  the  occupation  of  the  West  Bank  and  the  Gaza  Strip  (ICG  2007:  i). 
Furthermore,  the  Palestinians  in  Egypt  were  always  regarded  with  suspicion  by  the  central 
authorities, strongly disadvantaged, and not integrated into the Egyptian society. Last but not least, 
not only are the Palestinians of North Sinai  more orientated to the Northeast than to the West, but  
also the Bedouins in North Sinai have a strong relationship to those Bedouin tribes living in Israel 
with whom they share the same language and traditions (Pelham 2012). 
The two factors combined provide a first element in order to understand why the group in 
South Sinai is far less fragmented than the one in North Sinai.  This cohesion or fragmentation 
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simultaneously facilitates and  respectively complicates the management of relations between the 
members and the emergence of a sense of group identity. 
The likely most important factor facilitating group cohesion and nonviolent discipline in the 
South is the shared economic dependency of most members of the group upon tourism. In 2003, 
more than 2.6 million tourists visited South Sinai, which constitutes more than a third of all of the 
tourists coming to Egypt (ICG 2007) and is based on a rapid expansion of tourist infrastructure 
along the coast and in the area around Mount Sinai and the monastery of St. Katarina. The number  
of hotels in South Sinai for example exploded from seventeen in 1994 to over 220 in 2002, most of 
them located in Sharm el-Sheikh (Ibid.).  Considering the immense number of tourists in South 
Sinai, it is clear that both the state as a whole, as well as the locals in particular have a lot to lose if 
tourism is disrupted. Although NVP were favored as far as possible by the state in regard to jobs in 
the tourist industry (ICG 2007), the indigenous Bedouins in South Sinai were able to carve out a 
lucrative niche for themselves (Goodman 2012). On the one hand, they provide guided tours into 
the dessert and the mountains, own several of the camps in the north of Nuweiba as well as they 
were able to establish themselves as hotel owners in Dahab. Additionally, they control the extremely 
lucrative business of selling drugs – mainly hashish, marijuana and opium – to the tourists in Sharm 
el-Sheikh, Dahab and Nuweiba. The problem with tourism, in particular mass tourism, is, that most 
of the popular tourist destinations around the world offer fairly similar opportunities to tourists. 
Tourists  who might  fear  for  their  safety in  one tourist  destination,  “might  therefore  choose  an 
alternative destination with similar characteristics but in a more stable condition” (Neumayer 2004). 
As outlined by Eric Neumayer  in a  paper (2004) illustrating the quantitative negative effect of 
violence  on  tourism  in  different  countries,  in  particular  prolonged  violence  leads  to  further 
undermining  dynamics.  “If  the  violence  becomes  more  widespread  and  prolonged,  official 
authorities in the countries where tourists originate will start issuing advice against traveling to the 
destination. Tourist operators will start eliminating tours to the country due to insufficient bookings, 
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fear of liability suits, and the like and promote other destinations instead” (Neumayer 2004: 260). 
Tourism by its nature requires a stable and peaceful environment, otherwise tourists, in particular 
from the West, simply choose other destinations and avoid the troubled region. From February 2011 
onward this problem became evident and in March 2011 for example tourism in Sharm el-Sheikh 
had been down by at least 50 % compared to previous years (DPA 10.04.2011). As one hotel owner 
in South Sinai also confirmed, in particular European tourism had declined as those tourists like to 
move freely and without dangers and have a variety of alternative destinations available (Interview 
3). Therefore, people in South Sinai have a shared interest of maintaining a situation as stable as 
possible in order to safeguard their main source of income. As Joshua Goodman puts it,  “Sinai 
tourism is so reliant on political stability that any unrest by either Bedouin or the state would harm 
the economic interest of all parties” (Goodman 2012). 
Furthermore, tourists like to see a  presence of security forces. This also hinders locals from 
attacking police forces, who in turn are prevented from engaging in overly extreme or open acts of 
repression. Rather, somewhat of an unsaid agreement between all locals as well as the police has 
emerged, at least to the degree that order is to be maintained. The intention of the Bedouins to not  
let the political instability in Egypt after the ousting of Hosni Mubarak negatively affect the tourism 
in  Sinai  could  already  be  observed  immediately  following  the  uprising  in  February  2011.  As 
Mostafa ElMarsfawy, a journalist for Egypt Independent reported in April 2011, “Sinai Bedouins on 
Wednesday attacked  anti-Mubarak  demonstrators  who  were  protesting  before  Sharm el-Sheikh 
International Hospital, where deposed President Hosni Mubarak is said to be undergoing medical 
treatment” (Egypt Independent 13.04.2011). As reason for this the Bedouins did not mention pro-
Mubarak sentiments,  but  that  “they wanted to  restore calm in the region in  order to  reactivate 
tourism” (Ibid.). To be clear, also in South Sinai tensions between the groups and power  holders 
exist, but these do not escalate into violence. As James Purtill adequately sums up:
“Traveling in Sinai, there is a sense of competing powers stepping on each other's toes, yet all are trying 
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to present a good face to the visitors. If  it weren’t for the visitors, it  would be easy to see how the 
situation could quickly deteriorate. In private the Bedouin complain about the National Parks authority. 
The Egyptian government harasses the Bedouin. The Jabaliya Bedouin complain about Wadi Feiran. The 
non-Bedouin  business  owners  complain  about  the  Bedouin.  The  Jabaliya  Bedouin  complain  about 
certain Jabaliya Bedouin taking too large a cut of the tourism profits” (James Purtill 30.04.2012).
Conversely in the North, the three different groups depend on different sources of income. 
While the NVP are above all working in the few legally provided opportunities – factories, gas and 
oil industry, and Egyptian tourism to the Mediterranean – the Bedouins are largely excluded from 
these sectors, as a result of the “prioritization of NVP needs over those of the local population” 
(Pelham 2012: 9). “By diverting resources and land away from the Bedouins, state planning not 
only favored Egyptians relocating from the Nile Valley, it also weakened traditional tribal coping 
mechanisms, such as subsistence agriculture” (Pelham 2012: 9). Instead, like the Palestinians who 
are also severely disadvantaged by the state in regard to legal opportunities of occupation, they 
depend on smuggling and other illegal activities. The informal economy consists of the smuggling 
of  marijuana  and opium,  arms  and basic  goods,  and  people  and  organ  trafficking.  The  tunnel 
trafficking to Gaza for example is controlled by the three tribes of the Sawarka, the Rumaylat and 
the Tarabeen (Pelham 2012). Also further in the South of Al Arish, smuggling – here of cigarettes, 
drugs and migrants from Africa to the border in the North – constitutes a major source of income for 
the Bedouin. Not only does this mean that the group as a whole has fewer incentives to maintain  
stability, steep differences in regard to economic opportunities have emerged and split the group 
into different interest groups. Shootings as a result of these activities between security forces and 
locals are reoccurring. The large-scale involvement in more or less illegal activities led to a natural 
antagonism between security forces  and large parts  of  the population.  Either  security forces in 
North Sinai complicate business like smuggling, or if they turn a blind eye on it, they ask for their 
share. Generally speaking, the Egyptian government does not effectively hinder the business. In 
2010 for example a study for US Congress estimated that about 7.000 people were working in more 
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than  1.000  tunnels,  most  of  them “reportedly  of  a  generally  high  quality  of  engeneering  and 
construction – with some including electricity, ventilation, intercoms, and a rail system” (Zanotti 
2010: 8).
7.5. Different Experiences during Israeli occupation
The experiences  of  the local  population  with the  Israelis  during the time of  occupation 
varied significantly depending on whether one lived in the North or in the South. The  Israeli 
occupation  of  Sinai  and  its  policies  there  during  this  time  constitute  a  largely  neglected  and 
forgotten part of Israeli history with no in-depth studies, at least in English language, available. 
However,  the recent 30 year  anniversary of the forced evacuation of Israeli  settlers  from Sinai 
reveals a small glimpse into Israeli policies in the northern part of the region at that time. According 
to  Israeli  newspaper  Haaretz,  a  policy of  forced eviction of  indigenous people and subsequent 
settlement of Israelis took place in the North of Sinai (Haaretz 29.04.2013). There, on the border to 
Gaza for example, about 1.500 Bedouins of the Al-Rimlat tribe were expelled and the settlement of 
Yamit which was home to up to 2.500 settlers was established. Oded Lipschits, who together with a 
group of other Israelis tried to investigate the events wrote, “A group of members from kibuttzim in 
the region, including me, started to investigate. We went out and toured the area, and were stunned 
by  the  dimensions  of  wreckage  and  by  the  number  of  persons  expelled.  The  IDF  and  the 
government  denied  the  facts  that  we presented  and claimed they had merely evacuated  a  few 
nomads  from state  owned lands  onto  which  the  nomads had recently encroached” (Ibid.).  The 
forced eviction of locals and subsequent settlement of Israelis illustrates the security lens through 
which the Israeli government viewed those parts of Sinai directly to the south of its border. 
In the South of Sinai, however, the Israeli interests were above all of administrative nature 
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(Lavie 1984). By accepting in large parts the already existing tribal structures of rule (sheikhs ruling 
over  certain  families)  where  those  did  not  oppose  Israeli  occupation  and  furthermore  directly 
supplying families with food and medicine, the Israeli occupation force was able to built a more 
positive relationship with the Bedouin of Southern Sinai (Ibid.). “The Bedouin who had expected to 
be dealt with impersonally through the newly appointed sheikhs were astonished by this new, direct 
style” (Ibid.). This relationship was further enhanced with the providing of basic medical services 
and the buying of land for settlements instead of the eviction of residents. In particular in the central 
parts and in some newly established camps along the coast, this was seen as a “shining example of 
Israeli – Bedouin coexistence in South Sinai” (Ibid.). Last but not least rising numbers of tourists in 
South Sinai offered considerable, and contrary to smuggling, legal opportunities of income for the 
indigenous  people.  “When the  Bedouin  discovered  that  the  tourists  would  pay them for  food, 
drinks, and articles of clothing, they quickly grasped that a profit could be made from them” (Ibid.). 
To sum up the key difference of Israeli policy during the occupation of Sinai in the north and south, 
while  security  concerns  dominated  in  the  North  and  led  to  harsh  measures  against  the  local 
population,  the  relationship  in  South  Sinai  was  fairly  cooperative  and  characterized  by  Israeli 
tourism, instead of confrontation like in the North. In total, about 7.000 settlers had to be evacuated  
from Sinai in 1982, about 3.000 of them after violent confrontations with the IDF in particular in 
Yamit. 
8. Findings
Before arriving at a final conclusion, the analyzed processes will be traced back and the 
findings of this thesis will be related back to the above-introduced hypotheses. Process tracing is 
understood as “the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analyzed in light of 
research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator” (Collier 2011: 823). The intention is,  
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with a focus on the sequence of the different elements within the process to illustrate how the 
different  factors  in  combination  led  to  the  different  outcomes.  When  integrating  the  above-
conducted analysis of each of the factors derived from the theoretical literature, a consistent picture 
emerges.
The first factor constituting a relevant experience of the local Bedouin population were their 
differing experiences during the Israeli occupation. While in the North people were left behind in 
1982 with a traumatic experience of forced evictions and contacts with radical settlers, the Bedouins 
of South Sinai were, as a result of Israeli tourism, able to benefit financially from Israeli occupation. 
Furthermore,  they were spared the contact  with the radical  Israeli  settlers  of  the sort  living in 
settlements like Yamut. The reason for these different experiences lies in the Israeli security focus 
on the north of the peninsula and the  fairly administrative approach to its south. After 1982 then, 
back under Egyptian authority, the different approaches of the ruling authorities to the peninsula 
were continued. While the security lens constitutes the main perspective on both North and South 
Sinai, it was implemented far more rigorously in the North. Not only was the majority of NVP 
resettled by the Egyptian government allocated to this area, but  the security regime was also more 
tight  and brutal  here.  The indigenous population and the Palestinian refugees  were further  and 
further alienated from the Egyptian state. Then from the mid 1980s early 1990s onwards, the key 
difference explaining the violence in the North, respectively nonviolence in the South, manifested 
itself. While development in the North was promoted by the construction of some factories, tourism 
manifested itself as main source of income in the South. Although the Egyptian government in both 
areas excluded the indigenous population from the development, the Bedouins in South Sinai were 
able to maintain and expand their involvement in the tourism sector. As a result, a somewhat natural 
agreement emerged between security forces, Bedouins, and the NVP based on the shared interest to 
maintain peace and stability to retain the main source of income. In the North to the contrary, 
Palestinians and Bedouins were pushed further outside of the state into the illegal businesses of 
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smuggling and human trafficking.  What  emerged as  a consequence in  the North was a  natural 
antagonism  between  Palestinians  and  Bedouins  and  security  forces.  Following  the  Egyptian 
uprising of 2011 and the subsequent security vacuum in Sinai, those differences came to bear. In the 
South, driven by the shared economic interest, locals played their part in maintaining peace and 
stability and as a rational decision based on the costs of uprising refrained from violence. In the 
North on the other hand, individual spoilers and the different groups pursuing a variety of economic 
and  political  interests  increasingly  retreated  to  violence.  This  provided  an  inviting  context  for 
radicals from other areas, criminals, and Jihadis who had escaped prison, as well as for individual  
locals to express themselves violently in this environment.
 Returning  to  the  above-introduced  hypotheses,  several  results  can  be  summed  up. 
Regarding hypothesis one, political exclusion and oppression by the state in North Sinai was more 
brutal  than  in  the  South  and  also  more  prevalent.  This  led  to  higher  levels  of  grievances  and 
provides a first factor for the establishment of an environment that favors violence. Also the second 
hypothesis – economic exclusion – finds support. People in North Sinai live in one of the poorest 
districts of Egypt whereas people in the South aren't in such financially unstable situations after all. 
Hypothesis three also finds strong support. The potential losses in the tourism sector that could be 
expected from more violence in the South explains why people in the South rationally adhere to 
nonviolent discipline. Hypothesis four does not find much support as the state is equally able to 
respond in North and South. Hypothesis three is directly related to hypothesis five, as the shared 
source of income – tourism and related activities – provides the critical explanation for the cohesion 
of the society in the South. Despite being divided into a Bedouin and a NVP population, the shared 
interest overrides individual grievances resulting from political exclusion of the Bedouins or the 
preferential treatment of NVP. Furthermore the lack of such a uniting force in the North equally 
provides an explanation for the fragmentation of the people in the North and the resulting increased 
potential for individual spoilers. 
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One of  the  problems  with  such  small-n  qualitative  studies  however  is  the  difficulty  of 
concluding which of the factors was more important than others. However, in similar designs like in 
this case, the key difference in the independent variables is important to explain the difference.  
Structural preconditions – despite some differences – are rather similar in both cases and set a 
context that offers considerable opportunities to engage in violent activities without facing, at least 
initially, too much resistance by the state authorities given their limited presence. The dynamics 
resulting  from  illegal  economic  activities  and  openness  to  radical  influences  explain  how  the 
different actors are offered with opportunities to engage in violence. Unfortunately not all incidents 
can  be  recorded  based  on  newspaper  articles  and  the  empiric  evidence  is  too  scarce  for  any 
conclusions in this regard without further research. However, basically three main types of violent 
incidents can be distinguished.  About  a third of  the incidents  can be related to  radical  Islamic 
motives. Another part, about a fifth on the incidents, is clearly related to criminal activities. A large 
part of the remaining of the violence however occurs in form of small unconnected events. Neither 
are  these  mostly ineffective  attacks  on  security  forces  related  to  smuggling,  nor  are  there  any 
political  or  terrorist  groups taking any responsibility.  More  research  and extensive fieldwork – 
including if possible access to police or military records and talking extensively to people in the 
North  –  is  necessary  to  establish  a  reliable  empiric  basis  for  further  analysis.  The  key factor 
preventing this in the South is the societal cohesion as a result of the Bedouin involvement in the 
tourist sector. Cohesion alone is not sufficient to explain the nonoccurrence of violence, but in this 
case cohesion and stability go hand in hand.
9. Conclusion 
The  occurrence  of  violence  constitutes  a  complex and omnipresent  problem around  the 
globe. The difference in the amounts of violence between the analyzed cases cannot be explained 
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solely by structural differences or focusing on the assumed master cleavages. Instead, the violence 
is the result of varying agents with their different interests and motives. This thesis attempted to 
explain these differences in the occurrence of violence between North and South Sinai. In order to 
do so, several steps were conducted. First, the theoretical literature on the occurrence of violence 
was  scanned  and  the  relevant  independent  variables  –  economic  motives,  grievances,  social 
cohesion, and geopolitical environment were identified. Second, the chosen cases were introduced 
and the methodological approach outlined before further introducing the reader to the historical 
background  of  Sinai  and  the  generally  violence  favoring  similarities  between  the  two  areas. 
Subsequently,  the  extreme  differences  in  regard  to  the  dependent  variable  were  illustrated. 
Afterward, getting into the explanatory sector, the different independent variables and the relevant 
indicators  were  further  analyzed  before  the  process  that  leads  to  the  different  outcomes  was 
outlined.
The main implications of this thesis – theoretically as well as practically – are as follows. 
Theoretically,  the first  point relates to the relevance of the theoretical approaches regarding the 
occurrence  of  violence,  or  respectively  the  factors  that  prevent  it  from  occurring.  The  thesis 
consisted of a comparison of two very similar cases, North and South Sinai, that however differed 
in some regards. It seems to be the case that the recent focus of the scholarship on the different 
drivers of violence is justified, at least the studied cases suggest so. Economic motives, grievances, 
societal cohesion and local dynamics, and the geopolitical context together explain a large piece of 
the puzzle as to why the frustration about government ignorance, mistreatment, and undelivered 
development promises escalated into violence in the Northern part of the peninsula but not in the 
South. One of the core arguments of this thesis is that there are forces – in this case the shared 
economic dependency on tourism – that can override ethnic differences, tensions among locals, and 
the political exclusion of parts of the people. Theoretical approaches focusing on a deeper analysis 
of the forces that pull the members of ethnically fragmented societies together and thereby increase 
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group cohesion are of high interest for future research. However, far more research and in-depth 
process tracing is necessary to investigate how these forces function, and why individual potential 
spoilers adhere to the nonviolent discipline. This much is obvious, the presence of more than one 
ethnic group – what is traditionally understood as ethnic fragmentation – does not necessarily mean 
that those people cannot act as an entity in certain regards. The findings of this thesis therefore 
support the bulk of literature that argues that it is not different ethnics, but what the state does with  
them, that makes a situation turn violent. Furthermore, it highlights the importance to view agents 
as individual actors who each have a position in the economic and political system that strongly 
influences their behavior.
From a practical perspective, the most important finding is that there is no evidence for the 
claims of those who describe Sinai as a new base of Al Qaeda or related terrorist organizations, as 
well as there is no support for claims of an escalating conflict along a supposed master cleavage 
between the Egyptian state and the indigenous Bedouins. The attacks that occurred were neither 
well organized, nor supported by the broad public, nor very effective – the exception being the 
attack on the Egyptian border post on 05.08.2012. Instead of being orchestrated efforts by one or 
more terror groups, the majority rather seems to be the result of either the illegal economic activities 
or individual grievances. Claims such as those by Benjamin Netanyahu, “The Sinai is turning into a 
kind of Wild West which … terror groups from Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Al-Qaeda, with the aid of  
Iran,  are  using  to  smuggle  arms,  to  bring  arms,  to  mount  attacks  against  Israel”  (Reuters 
24.04.2012) are disproportionate and a sign of dangerous simplification. Certainly, some attacks can 
be traced back to radical groups, masked gunmen carrying the black flag of Al Qaeda have been 
seen several times. Attacks on Israeli and Christian targets were committed, and the fact that some 
of the actors present in Sinai have a similar target list – Christians, Jews and Westerners – as terror 
groups in other countries has to be acknowledged. Also the environment of Gaza and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict facilitates the labeling of individual acts of violence against security forces as 
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terrorism or radicalism. However, compared to previous attacks in Egypt – the Luxor Massacre of 
1997 that left 62 tourists dead, or the wave of terror hitting the Southern Sinai tourist destinations in 
and around Taba, Nuweiba, Dahab and Sharm el-Sheikh between 2004 and 2006 that left more than 
140 people dead the current outbursts of violence appear minimal and, as said, very unorganized. 
Furthermore, while the former attacks clearly targeted Western and particularly Israeli targets, a 
similar pattern cannot be observed at the moment. 
Sinai,  as  mentioned above,  functions  as  a  buffer  zone between Egypt  and Israel.  If  the 
situation in Sinai continues to erode, it is unlikely that the old security arrangement between Israel 
and Egypt can be upheld because Egypt would be forced to deploy more own troops to the border 
area to Israel. This however would face strong resistance from Israel, as demilitarization of Sinai 
constitutes an essential pillar of their security architecture.  To allow Israeli troops to enter Sinai and 
face  the  emerging  threats  there  themselves  is  also  not  an  option,  therefore  Egypt  has  to  find 
manners to calm the situation in Sinai without relying on excessive military force. At the root of the 
current  tensions  are economic  problems  resulting  from  the  systematic  exclusion  of  Sinai's 
indigenous population and the Palestinians and Egypt would be well advised to alter its politics 
towards the Sinai and its people rather sooner than later. Otherwise, a further escalation is likely, if  
not even predictable. This was also the case for the current crisis and Lavie and Young in an article 
on Sinai under Israeli and Egyptian occupation already in 1984 made clear: “Egyptian policies, if 
actually implemented, will permanently disrupt the fragile balance of the peninsula, and make the 
Bedouin into marginal migrant laborers in their own homeland. Mistakes made in haste now will 
certainly be extremely costly to correct and will plague the peoples of Egypt and Sinai for years to 
come” (Lavie and Young 1984: 43).
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10. Appendix: List of recorded incidents
Date Place Description of Incident Participants Victims Source of 
Information
17.01.13 Police kill 
gunman 
on Bir al-
Abd – 
Arish 
road (NS)
Shootout between two 
gunmen and police 
when police wanted to 
check their car
Unidentified 
Assailants, 
Security Forces
One attacker 
dead, second 
gunman 
escaped
Al-Masry Al-
Youm
12.01.13 Wadi al-
Omar 
Area (NS)
Shootout between 
security forces and 
smugglers 
Smugglers, 
Security Forces
Eight 
policemen 
injured, one 
smuggler 
dead
Egypt 
Independent
03.01.13 Abu 
Redis 
(SS)
Police car hijacked by 
armed assailants after 
fire exchange 
Unidentified 
Assailants, 
Security Forces
None Al-Ahram
25.11.12 Qaseema 
(NS)
Explosion of bombs 
planted in partly 
constructed building of 
Egy security fources
Unidentified 
Assailants, 
Security Forces
Unclear Al-Masry Al-
Youm
22.11.12 Goura 
area (NS)
Gunmen fire at car 
owned by international 
peacekeeping forces in 
Sinai
Unidentified 
Assailants, MNO
Unclear Al-Masry Al-
Youm
22.11.12 Gura Area 
(NS)
Protesters shoot at 
checkpoint close to 
peacekeepers camp, 
security forces return 
fire
Locals (likely 
Bedouins)
One local 
dead
Al-Masry Al-
Youm
14.11.12 Israeli 
side of the 
border 
(Isr)
Four missiles 
(allegedly fired from 
Sinai) land in Israel 
Unidentified 
Assailants 
None Egypt 
Independent
11.11.12 Rafah 
(NS)
Gunmen attack security 
forces camp
Unidentified 
Assailants, 
Security Forces
None Al-Ahram
09.11.12 Bir al-
Abed 
Area (NS)
Tribal feud turned 
violent
Bedouins Four 
Bedouins 
killed and 20 
severely 
injured
Al-Masry Al-
Youm
06.11.12 Arish City Gunmen attack police Unidentified One police Al-Masry Al-
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(NS) car in Arish City Assailants, 
Security Forces
officer 
injured
Youm
03.11.12 Arish City 
(NS)
Unidentified gunmen 
attack police patrol
Unidentified 
Assailants, 
Security Forces
Three 
policemen 
dead, five 
injured 
Reuters
29.10.12 Arish City 
(NS)
Army shoots at cab 
trying to run 
checkpoint
Security Forces, 
Locals
Cab driver 
dead, 
passenger 
injured
Al-Masry Al-
Youm
22.10.12 Abordis 
(SS)
Gunmen attack gas 
station
Unidentified 
Assailants
One 
policeman 
injured
MENA
08.10.12 Arish City 
(NS)
Gunfight between two 
armed men and 
security forces
Unidentified 
Assailants, 
Security Forces
One 
policeman 
dead, one 
attacker dead
MENA
28.09.12 Arish 
(NS)
Gunmen opens fire at 
Coptic owned store
Unidentified 
Assailants, Locals
None Egypt 
Independent
21.09.12 Egyptian-
Israeli 
border 
(NS)
Israeli Army shoots 
three heavily armed 
gunmen sneaking into 
Israel 
Unidentified 
Assailants, IA
One Israeli 
soldier and 
three 
gunmen dead
AFP
16.09.12 Sheikh 
Zuwayed 
(NS)
Unidentified gunmen 
attack police station
Unidentified 
Assailants, 
Security Forces
Seven 
security 
forces 
members and 
three 
civilians 
injured
Egypt 
Independent
14.09.12 MNO 
camp 
(NS)
Bedouins storm 
peacekeeper camp
Bedouins, MNO Three people 
injured
Al-Ahram
09.09.12 Operation 
Eagle 
Press 
conferenc
e
North Sinai Operation Eagle 
to attack militants 
in North Sinai 
following 5/8 
attack
32 criminals 
killed, 58 
arrested
Ahmed Abu 
Draa
08.09.12 Sheikh 
Zuwayed 
(NS) 
Unidentified gunmen 
attack police 
department
Unknown None MENA
07.09.12 Rayesa 
Checkpoi
nt outisde 
Arish 
Unidentified gunmen 
attack checkpoint
Unidentified 
Assailants, 
Security Forces
None MENA
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(NS)
06.09.12 Arish 
Airport 
(NS)
Unidentified gunmen 
attack checkpoint on 
Arish-Airport road
Unidentified 
Assailants, 
Security Forces
None MENA
05.09.12 Al-Tor 
(SS)
Gunmen attack police 
station
Unidentified 
Assailants, 
Security Forces
None Al-Masry Al-
Youm
01.09.12 Sinai 
(NS)
Egyptian reportedly 
beheaded by Sinai 
militants
Bedouin Militants One local 
dead
AFP
31.08.12 Arish-
Rafah 
Road 
(NS)
Rayesa checkpoint 
attacked
Unidentified 
Assailants, 
Security Forces
None MENA
30.08.12 South of 
Karam 
Abu 
Salem 
border 
crossing 
(NS)
Clashes between 
suspected smugglers 
and Egyptian security 
forces
Smugglers, 
Security Forces
Two soldiers 
injured
Al-Masry Al-
Youm
27.08.12 Arish 
Checkpoi
nt (NS)
Gunmen fire on 
checkpoint
Unidentified 
Assailants, 
Security Forces
None Al-Masry Al-
Youm
26.08.12 Khariza 
Area (NS)
Explosion kills 
motorcycle driver, 
cause unclear (carried 
explosives, land mine, 
Israeli airstrike)
Locals One local 
dead
Al-Masry Al-
Youm
24.08.12 Arish and 
Sheikh 
Zuwayed 
checkpoin
ts (NS)
Masked gunmen open 
fire on checkpoints
Unidentified 
Assailants, 
Security Forces
None MENA
19.08.12 Rayesa 
Checkpoi
nt (NS)
Unidentified gunmen 
open fire on checkpoint 
Unidentified 
Assailants, 
Security Forces
None Al-Masry Al-
Youm
15.08.12 Eilat (Isr) Two powerful 
explosions in Eilat, 
rockets allegedly from 
Israel 
Unidentified 
Assailants
None AFP
14.08.12 Arish 
Checkpoi
nt (NS)
Gunmen open fire at a 
checkpoint
Unidentified 
Assailants, 
Security Forces
None Reuters
13.08.12 Border to Gunmen kill tribal Unidentified Two Reuters
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Israel 
(NS)
leader and son in Israel Assailants, 
Bedouins
Bedouins 
dead
13.08.12 Kharouba 
(NS)
Security forces 
(supported by local 
Bedouin) raid arms 
depot
Security Forces, 
Militants
Five 
Militants 
dead
Al-Masry Al-
Youm
12.08.12 Arish 
(NS)
Militants attack Arish 
Police Station
Militants, 
Security Forces
None Al-Masry Al-
Youm
12.08.12 Al-Goura 
(NS)
Shootout between 
armed forces and 
militant gunmen
Security Forces, 
Militants
Seven 
militants 
dead
Egypt 
Independent
12.08.12 Sheikh 
Zuwayed 
/ Arish 
(NS)
Several Checkpoints 
attacked
Militants, 
Security Forces
None Egypt 
Independent 
12.08.12 Internatio
nal Road 
(NS)
Car chase Security Forces, 
Militants
Three 
soldiers 
dead, four 
policemen 
injured
Egypt 
Independent
08.08.12 Border to 
Israel 
(NS)
Military forces and jets 
kill 20 militants
Security Forces, 
Militants
20 militants 
dead
Egypt 
Independent 
08.08.12 NS Seven checkpoints 
attacked by gunmen
Militants, 
Security Forces 
(witnesses)
One soldier 
and one local 
wounded
Ashgan Harb
07.08.12 Wadi-
Firan  
(NS)
16 parked police cars 
attacked
Unidentified 
Assailants, 
Security Forces
None Al-Masry Al-
Youm
07.08.12 Ras Sidr 
(SS)
Shots fired at a car 
belonging to the 
Education Ministry en 
route from Cairo
Unidentified 
Assailants, 
Government
None Al-Masry Al-
Youm
05.08.12 Border to 
Israel 
close to 
Rafah 
(NS)
Militants attack police 
station, steal armed 
vehicle and cross into 
Israel where they are 
killed immediately
Militants, 
Security Forces
16 Egyptian 
security 
forces 
members 
dead, seven 
injured, four 
attackers 
dead on 
Israeli 
Territory
Al-Masry Al-
Youm
01.08.12 Egyptian-
Israeli 
Fire exchange across 
border between Israeli 
Unidentified 
Assailants, IA
None Al-Ahram
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border 
(NS)
Army and gunmen
27.07.12 Rafah 
Crossing 
(NS)
Shootout between 
security forces and 
suspected smugglers
Security Forces, 
smugglers
None MENA
22.07.12 Central 
Southern 
Part of 
Egy-
Israeli 
Border 
(NS)
Shots fired at Israeli 
Army bus from Sinai
Unidentified 
Assailants, IA
None AFP
19.07.12 Sheikh 
Zuwayed 
(NS)
Gunmen shoot at 
checkpoint 
Militants, 
Security Forces
Two soldiers 
dead
Egypt 
Independent
13.07.12 Nikhil 
(SS)
Two American tourists 
and tourguide 
kidnapped to pressure 
government (released 
16.07.)
Bedouins, 
Tourists 
None Ashgan Harb
11.07.12 Ramady 
(NS)
Gunmen storm cement 
factory and sabotage 
equipment
Unidentified 
Assailants
None Al-Masry Al-
Youm 
30.06.12 Hasna 
(NS)
Gunmen open fire on 
army vehicle
Unidentified 
Assailants, 
Security Forces
One soldier 
dead, one 
soldier 
injured
Al-Masry Al-
Youm 
18.06.12 Egyptian-
Israeli 
Border 
(NS)
Militants cross to Israel 
from Sinai, kill one 
civilian before being 
attacked by Israeli 
forces
Militants, IA One Israeli 
Civilian 
dead, one 
militant dead
MENA
16.06.12 Arava 
Valley 
(Isr)
Explosion in Southern 
Israel, Israel says 
rocket from Sinai, 
Egypt denies
Unidentified 
Assailants
None Al-Masry Al-
Youm 
31.05.12 Rafah 
(NS)
Tribal feud between 
Rumailat and 
Barahama escalates 
into battle
Bedouins Six Bedouins 
injured
Al-Masry Al-
Youm
31.05.12 Dahab-
Nuweiba 
road (SS)
Bedouin kidnap two 
American tourists to 
pressure government  
(released same day)
Bedouins, 
Tourists 
None Al-Masry Al-
Youm 
07.05.12 NS 10 Fiji Peacekeepers Bedouins, MNO None Reuters
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kidnapped by Bedouin 
(released one day later)
06.05.12 NS Gunmen attack police 
checkpoint
Unidentified 
Assailants, 
Security Forces
None Al-Masry Al-
Youm 
02.05.12 NS RPG fired at police 
checkpoint 
Unidentified 
Assailants, 
Security Forces
One 
policeman 
dead
Egypt 
Independent
15.04.12 Arish 
(NS)
Gunmen attack police 
checkpoint
Unidentified 
Assailants, 
Security Forces
Two 
policemen 
dead, one 
injured
AP
05.04.12 Eilat (Isr) Rocket hits Eilat Unidentified 
Assailants
None Reuters
27.03.12 Rafah 
(NS)
Fire exchange between 
Israeli and Egyptian 
forces following 
attempt to pursue 
smugglers
IA, Security 
Forces
One Israeli 
dead, two 
Egyptians 
injured
Al-Ahram
23.03.12 Rafah 
(NS)
Gunmen seize police 
vehicle and torture 
three soldiers
Unidentified 
Assailants, 
Security Forces
Three 
soldiers 
injured
MENA
22.03.12 Nuweiba-
Dahab 
Road (SS)
Czech tourguide 
kidnapped by gunmen 
Bedouins, 
Tourists
None Egypt 
Independent
18.03.12 St. 
Catherine 
Area (SS)
Two Brazilian Tourists 
kidnapped (released 
after one day)
Bedouins, 
Tourists
None AFP
16.03.12 Egyptian-
Israeli 
border 
(NS)
Israeli troops prevent 
border crossing
Israeli Army, 
Smugglers
One 
smuggler 
dead, three 
injured
Egypt 
Independent
28.02.12 Egyptian-
Israeli 
Border 
(NS)
Israeli army prevents 
illegal border crossing
Israeli Army, 
Militants
One militant 
dead
AFP
10.02.12 St. 
Catherine 
Area (SS)
Three Korean Tourists 
kidnapped (released 
unharmed)
Bedouins, 
Tourists
None Reuters
08.02.12 Sharm 
(SS)
Police prevents 
attempted robbery in 
Sharm
Unidentified 
Assailants, 
Security Forces
One 
policeman 
injured
Al-Masry Al-
Youm 
31.01.12 (NS) Chinese workers 
kidnapped by Bedouin 
(released after one day)
Bedouins, 
Tourists
None Reuters
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29.01.12 Egyptian-
Israeli 
border 
(NS)
Border Guards shot at 
by smugglers
Smugglers, 
Security Forces
One soldier 
injured
MENA
28.01.12 Sharm 
(SS)
Revenge drive by 
shooting for killed 
Bedouin
Bedouins, 
Tourists 
One French 
tourist dead
Egypt 
Independent
28.01.12 Sharm 
(SS)
Bedouin shot by police PF, Bedouins One Bedouin 
dead
Egypt 
Independent
21.11.11 NS Gunfight during 
attempt to arrest 
members of Jihadi 
group
Security Forces, 
Militants
One 
policeman 
dead, one 
injured
MENA
14.11.11 NS Escalation in fights 
between Bedouin about 
organ trafficking
Bedouins Unclear, at 
least one 
Bedouin 
dead
Osama Khaled
25.10.11 Egyptian-
Israeli 
border 
(NS)
Police trying to stop 
smugglers
Security Forces, 
smugglers
One 
policeman 
injured
MENA
12.09.11 Tawil 
Area (NS)
Gunfire exchange at 
police checkpoint
Security Forces, 
Militants 
Two 
policemen 
wounded
Osama Khaled
19.08.11 Checkpoi
nt 79. 
(NS)
Suicide bomber attacks 
checkpoint
Supposedly 
Bedouin but 
unclear
One soldier 
dead, two 
soldiers 
injured
Osama Khaled
19.08.11 Egyptian-
Israeli 
border 
(NS)
Gunfight near border Security Forces, 
Unidentified 
Assailants
One 
policeman 
killed, one 
injured
AFP
19.08.11 NS Several checkpoints 
attacked
Militants, 
Security Forces
Unknown Ahmed Abu 
Draa
19.08.11 Egyptian-
Israeli 
border 
(NS)
Five Egyptian soldiers 
killed during Israeli 
attempt to hunt down 
militants after attack in 
Israel
IA, Security 
Forces, Militants
Five 
Egyptian 
soldiers dead
Reuters
18.08.11 Southern 
Israel (Isr)
Three attacks on targets 
in Israel
Unidentified 
Assailants
Eight Israelis 
dead
Egypt 
Independent
15.08.11 NS Gunfight between 
Army and gunmen
AS, Militants One gunman 
dead
Ahmed abu Draa
30.07.11 Arish 
(NS)
Show of strength of 
militants in Arish, 
Militants One soldier 
dead, three 
Reuters
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subsequent attack on 
police station 
civilians 
dead
22.06.11 NS Police patrol attacked Unidentified 
Assailants, 
Security Forces
Two 
policemen 
dead
AP
04.06.11 Arish 
(NS)
Truck hits checkpoint Unclear Three 
soldiers dead
AP
15.05.11 NS Sheikh Zuwayed 
Shrine bombed
Salafi Militants None Reuters
06.05.11 Arish 
(NS)
Gunfight between 
military and armed 
gang
Smugglers, 
Security Forces
One soldier 
dead, one 
soldier 
injured, one 
civilian 
injured
Reuters
13.04.11 Sharm 
(SS)
Bedouins attack anti-
Mubarak protesters 
with rocks and stones 
to restore order and 
reactivate tourism
Bedouins, locals Several 
locals injured
Mostafa El-
Marsfawy
24.02.11 Egyptian-
Israeli 
border 
(NS)
Gunfight between 
smugglers and 
policemen
Smugglers, 
Security Forces
One 
policeman 
dead
Egypt 
Independent
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